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Abstract
This thesis focuses on provincial reactions to the Supreme Court decision on 5 June 2005, Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General).  In this decision, the Court struck down the government of Québec’s ban 
on private insurance for publicly-insured services, on the grounds it violated the Québec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, while the decision on the Canadian Charter ended in a 3:3 tie with one 
abstention.  It is the purpose of this research to examine the reactions of each provincial government 
to the decision in an attempt to understand why each province responded in its chosen manner.  In 
order to make this determination, four hypotheses were constructed in order to test four separate 
variables: court interference, current law, ideology, and political calculation.  These hypotheses were 
tested against provincial reactions in the media, legislatures, court documents, and E-mail 
administered questionnaires.  This research finds that each hypothesis had some success in predicting 
provincial reactions to the decision, with a government’s current law and ideology proving to be the 
most accurate predictors.  Based on the evidence gathered, three conclusions were arrived at: first, a 
government’s law and its ideology will often predict how a government will behave; second, that 
governments are open to Supreme Court decisions in the area of health care, and, finally, that if 
provincial governments were to make the decision to increase the role of the private sector in health 
care, political leaders would require public opinion be in support of such a decision rather than act 
solely on an ideological predisposition to greater private sector involvement.
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In June 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), ruled 
Québec’s ban on private health insurance as an infringement of the Québec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms.  Though not ruled to be a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
the ruling prompted media observers to declare the ruling as presaging the end of medicare in Canada.  
Dr. Jacques Chaoulli, a doctor who wanted to offer private health services, and Mr. George 
Zeliotis, a patient who had been on a waiting list in the Québec health system, teamed up to challenge 
Québec’s prohibition of private insurance for publicly-insured services.  The two argued that 
Québec’s prohibition of private insurance for publicly-insured services violated both the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.  They lost 
their first trial in 2000, as the trial judge concluded that the impugned laws did not violate the 
Canadian or Québec Charters.1  A unanimous Québec Court of Appeal upheld this decision in 2002.2  
The two previous losses contributed to the surprise many felt when the Supreme Court reversed the 
Québec courts in a 4:3 finding that the law violated the Québec Charter, while the decision on the 
Canadian Charter ended in a 3:3 tie with one abstention.  In light of the media attention the decision 
received and the potential ripple effect some governments believed the decision could cause, 
provincial governments responded swiftly to the decision, both in the media and in their legislatures.  
Explaining why each provincial government responded in its chosen manner is the focus of the study.
Provincial responses to the decision varied.  Premier Ralph Klein openly welcomed the 
decision continuing with his government’s desire to expand the role of the private sector in health 
care while Premier McGuinty strongly opposed the decision as his government has showed continued 
                                                
1 2000 R.J.Q 786. 
2 2002 R.J.Q. 105
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support for universal health care, including the enactment of the Commitment to the Future of 
Medicare Act, 2004.  Other provinces such as British Columbia responded in a manner inconsistent 
with previous policies as the government reacted negatively to the decision despite allowing the 
operation of private clinics within the province. 
This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the factors that play critical roles in the 
decisions taken by provincial governments.  What factors would prompt a government to respond in 
favour or against a court decision striking down a law that is in place?  Why would a government 
react either positively or negatively to a decision that has no bearing on its current law?   In 
examining these questions, the reactions of each provincial government to the Chaoulli decision, as 
reported in the media, given in legislatures, and presented in court documents, will be examined.   
There are a number of hypotheses that might be constructed to generate expectations regarding 
provincial reactions to the verdict handed down in the Chaoulli case.  Upon an initial review of the 
verdict, one might be led to believe that all provincial governments would resist, on principle, the 
Supreme Court handing down a ruling that undermines the role of elected provincial legislatures.  
Alternatively, one might expect that provincial governments might react in a more pragmatic fashion, 
in order to defend their own existing policies.  An example of this might be that one would expect 
that provincial governments that already implement a similar ban to the one in Québec would react 
negatively to the decision.  Conversely, provincial governments who do not implement such a ban 
could be expected to provide little resistance to the ruling.  Further, one might expect provincial 
governments to react based on their ideology, with provincial governments that are in favour of 
increasing the private sector role in health care praising such a decision while provincial governments 
that are ideologically in favour of preserving the system opposing.  Finally, one might expect public 
opinion may play a role, as provincial governments may be more likely to oppose the decision when 
public opinion in their province is not favourable of the decision.      
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Testing the predicted response of the provincial governments against their actual reactions reveals 
that a government’s current law and its ideology are the most accurate predictor of how a government 
should react to the Chaoulli decision.  Most provinces reacted to the decision in a manner consistent 
with their current law or ideology.  Political calculation, while correctly predicting a few government 
reactions, did not have the same level of accuracy as a predictor of governmental behaviour as a 
province’s current law or ideology.  
The few governments that openly supported the Court ruling on a provincial law, a ruling that 
ultimately undermined the role of provincial legislatures, did so because the decision was in line with 
their ideology.  This response allowed governments that supported the Court’s ruling to openly 
pursue their policy goals in a more vigorous manner than they would have without judicial 
affirmation from the top court in the country.  Finally, testing the hypotheses revealed that a number 
of provinces also chose to follow their political calculation and react in a manner consistent with 
public opinion within their province.   
To lay the basis for this inquiry, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the case; what the decision was 
based on, what the decision means for provincial governments other than Québec, and discusses the 
potential of similar challenges in the future.  Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature in order to 
provide a better understanding of the debates surrounding the motivations of political actors in 
general, as well as the effects of a federal system on such motivations, ultimately generating expected 
governmental behaviour to the decision.  Chapter 4 then outlines the predicted responses of each 
provincial government based on four separate criteria: response to Supreme Court intrusion, current 
law, ideological disposition, and public opinion.     
Reviewing the reactions of each provincial government in the media, legislature debates, court 
documents and e-mail administered questionnaires is the subject of Chapter 5.  The reactions are then 
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compared and analyzed against the predicted reactions in Chapter 6.  This analysis will uncover 
which hypothesis explains the highest number of provincial reactions.  Through this discovery we 
learn that legislative position, ideology, and political calculation are important factors in determining 
how provincial governments will react when faced with a difficult decision, with a government’s 
current law and ideology being the most important.  This determination will aid us in answering the 
fundamental question of what explains the provincial governments’ reaction to the Chaoulli decision.  
In order to analyze how governments reacted to the verdict, the case itself must first be analyzed, and 
that is the subject of Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
What Was Actually Decided in the Chaoulli Case
A survey of the headlines in major papers the day following the decision, as pointed out by Peter H. 
Russell, reveals how the decision and its effects on health care in Canada were grossly 
misrepresented.  The Globe and Mail trumpeted “ The New Face of Medicare,” while the Toronto 
Star screamed  “Timely Health Care a Basic Right.”  This was followed by leading columnists 
portending that medicare had been dealt a fatal blow.3  The truth is the decision has the potential to 
lead to a major shift in health care strategies in each province, but whether or not it will, will be 
determined over time and by politicians.  The verdict in the Chaoulli case has the capability to change 
the landscape of the debate, and could lead to shifts in health care schemes in different provinces 
across Canada; however, the decision currently only applies to Québec.  
Dr. Chaoulli and Mr. Zeliotis managed to have their case heard by the Supreme Court of Canada 
although originally losing the case in two lower courts in Québec.    The verdict handed down by the 
Court contained judgments on both the Québec Charter, and the Canadian Charter.  The Canadian 
Charter decision was based on S.7,4 with focus on the security of the person.  In this decision, the 
judges were deadlocked at 3-3, with one abstention; thus, the Supreme Court did not find the law to 
be a violation of the Canadian Charter.  Justice Deschamps abstained, declining to address the 
question of whether the law contravened the Canadian Charter, believing that deciding if the law 
contravened the Canadian Charter should only take place if the statute does not infringe the Québec 
Charter.  Following this line of thinking, Justice Deschamps found that the law did infringe the 
                                                
3 Russell, Peter H.  “Chaoulli: The Political Versus the Legal Life of a Judicial Decision”
Access To Care, Access to Justice.  Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2005.  Pg. 5
4 S.7 of the Canadian Charter states “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice”.
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Québec Charter, thus making it unnecessary to test the Canadian Charter.5  This tie has lead many 
people to believe that challenges to the Canadian Charter will be raised across the country in 
different provinces; however, it is important to note that Justice Deschamps points out “the appellants 
do not contend that they have a constitutional right to private insurance.”6  However, the decision on 
the Québec Charter contained a more straightforward consequence.  
The decision on the Québec Charter was based on two separate statutes.  The two statutes in 
question, s. 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act and s.15 of the Health Insurance Act, prohibit private 
insurance for health care services available in the public system, which the majority stated violated 
the right to personal ‘inviolability’ in section 1 of the Québec Charter.7  The actual legal scope of the 
decision has been determined quite narrowly.  As it stands, due to the lack of a majority ruling on the 
question of whether a prohibitive ban on private insurance violates the Canadian Charter, there is no 
legal applicability outside of the province of Québec.  
Although it may seem intuitive that a provincial prohibition on private health insurance would 
trigger a Charter challenge, it would not constitute sufficient grounds to trigger the application of 
fundamental constitutional rights.  As Caufield and Ries point out, “the legislative prohibition must 
be combined with ill-managed wait lists and improperly-resourced public health care systems that 
increase risk of mortality and serious morbidity”8, thus requiring more than a simple prohibition on 
private health insurance.  Supreme Court Justices McLachlin and Major point out in their decision 
that a ban on private health insurance “might be constitutional in circumstances where health care 
                                                
5 Russell.  Pg. 7
6 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 14.
7 Russell.  Pg. 6
8 Caufield, Timothy and Nola M. Ries.  “Politics and Paradoxes: Chaoulli and the Alberta 
Reaction.” Access To Care, Access to Justice.  Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2005.  
Pg. 419
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services are reasonable as to both quality and timeliness.”9  Some observers see the need for the 
combination to trigger the application of fundamental constitutional rights as a potential saviour.  If 
provinces put a concerted effort into reducing wait times, it may prevent future challenges on 
provincial prohibitions, and, thus, prevent provincial bans from being struck down in the same 
manner as Québec’s.  
The verdict in the Chaoulli decision does not guarantee that similar challenges will occur in 
provinces implementing comparable bans.  When attempting to determine the likelihood of 
challenges in other provinces, it is important to note that the decision was ten years in the making, as 
the case worked its way vertically through the court system, indicating that it would take some time 
for a challenge to reach the top court in that province.  However, although another challenge may take 
a while to work its way through the court system, until wait times are reduced and resources properly 
managed in the eyes of the Court, the potential problems deriving from the decision are still present in 
many of the provinces.  Further, as pointed out by Boychuk, “the decision itself is also not a 
fundamental challenge to the CHA [Canada Health Act], as the CHA does not require (or even 
suggest) a ban on third-party insurance for insured services.”10  This point made by Boychuk is an 
important one, as many observers saw the decision as a challenge to the CHA, not realizing the 
manoeuvrability provincial governments have within the Act.  There are a wide variety of means used 
by various provincial governments to limit the growth of private insurance for publicly-insured 
services other than an explicit ban, and some governments are looking to implement contingency 
plans in order to prepare, for what they may view, as the worst case scenario.
                                                
9 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 158
10 Boychuk, Gerard W. "Provincial Approaches to Funding Health Services in the Post-
Chaoulli Era." CPSA June: (2006): pg. 1
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2.1 Future Challenges
Another important factor when evaluating what was decided in the Chaoulli decision is the makeup of 
the Supreme Court during the hearing of the case.  If a similar challenge comes before the Court, the 
Justices who handed down their decision in the Chaoulli case would not all still be sitting justices.  
Justice Major retired on 25 December 2005, and was one of the four judges who voted to strike down 
the Québec prohibition.  Justice Major was also one of the three justices in favour of a wider view of 
section 7, which would have meant application of the decision to all of Canada.  Therefore, Justice 
Major’s replacement, Justice Rothstein, may play a key role in determining the future of this decision.  
Also, future challenges may face difficulty in a similar vein, as the two justices who did not take part 
in the case, Justices Abella and Charron, are seen as less likely to accept the wider view held of 
section 7, with Justice Abella being the more likely of the two to possibly shift towards such a view.11  
A change in the composition of the Court is unlikely to lead to a different outcome.  However, 
provincial governments that institute an explicit ban on private insurance for publicly-insured services 
cannot rely on the potential makeup of the Court.  Those governments who ban private insurance 
must take action in order to reduce the possibility of similar triggers to those in the Chaoulli case 
from occurring if they intend to prevent the growth of private financing of publicly-insured services.
Therefore, the results of the Chaoulli decision are not as grim as those presented in the media 
immediately following the decision.  The decision currently applies only to the province of Québec, 
and provincial governments implementing similar bans have the opportunity to eliminate aspects of 
their health care delivery system that may act as triggers, which will protect them if future challenges 
arise.  Each provincial government has a different opinion on how to go about delivering health care, 
as well as a different opinion on what the decision means and how they will respond to it.
                                                




Since the study’s focus is on the reactions provided by each provincial government to the 
Chaoulli decision, and thus the behaviour of provincial governments, it is important to first 
understand the environment within which these governments operate.  This chapter will 
review the relevant literature in order to provide a better understanding of the debates 
surrounding the motivations of political actors in general, as well as the effects of a federal 
system on such motivations, and generate expectations as to how each provincial government 
should react to the decision.  Initially, it will be important to discuss the behaviour of 
governments in a federal system, paying careful attention to both national and sub-national 
governments. Such an overview will reveal that provincial governments are protective over 
any autonomy they have gained since Confederation and act defensively when they perceive 
the possibility of outside interference into areas falling under their jurisdiction.  Similarly, 
this review will reveal many variables that are considered highly important when evaluating 
the motivations behind a government’s action.   
Political calculation as a variable determining governmental behaviour will be examined in order to 
help identify the role this variable plays in motivating provincial government reactions to the 
Chaoulli decision.  This investigation will illustrate that, in accordance with rational-choice 
institutionalism, once formal electoral rules have shaped the incentives facing political actors, these 
individuals will respond strategically to the electoral incentives, in this case public opinion, in 
consideration of the fact that they are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office.  A 
review of public opinion data within each province will generate expectations of each provincial 
government that will be further outlined in Chapter 4.  The hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 are 
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based largely on the expected behaviour of political actors, as determined from research presented in 
this chapter.
3.1 Canadian Federalism
A discussion of federalism is required because the reactions under examination in the study are 
coming from sub-national governments in a federal system.  When discussing federalism in Canada, 
it is naturally assumed that the term has a commonly understood meaning.  However, Garth 
Stevenson’s struggle to define federalism appropriately in a manner consistent with its practice in the 
Canadian situation demonstrates how the word is commonly used interchangeably with different 
meanings.  Stevenson’s investigation brings about many obstacles, such as definitions containing 
institutional and legal criteria, which eliminate all but one or two federations from inclusion to 
definitions that would include almost every country in the world as a federation.  A lack of consensus 
on a single definition has spawned many new attempts to define federalism, a practice that Stevenson 
does not wish to repeat, made obvious in his statement in noting there is “possibly no single definition 
of so elusive and controversial a concept [that] could be satisfactory for all purposes.”12   
Although he does not attempt to formulate a new definition, Stevenson does provide one that he 
feels is suitable for a pursuit in understanding Canadian government.  The definition Stevenson offers 
meets the three criteria he feels are essential: (1) the definition should not be unduly restrictive; (2) it 
should distinguish between a federal state, a unitary state, and looser forms of association; and lastly
                                                
12 Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity. London: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2004.  Pg. 8
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(3) it should emphasize the political aspects of federalism.13  With this criterion in mind, Stevenson 
defines federalism as,
A political system in which most or all of the structural elements of 
the state (executive, legislative, bureaucratic, judiciary, army or 
police, and machinery for levying taxation) are duplicated at two 
levels, with both sets of structures exercising effective control over 
the same territory and population.  Furthermore, neither set of 
structures (or level of government) should be able to abolish the 
other’s jurisdiction over this territory or population.  As a corollary 
of this, relations between the two levels of government will tend to 
be characterized by bargaining, since neither level can fully impose 
its will on the other.14
The enquiry will rely on Stevenson’s definition during the study.    
A definition of federalism has been established, and it is important to understand that Canadian 
federalism contains both national and sub-national governments operating in both an interdependent 
and an autonomous manner.  The interdependence of the central and unit governments implies that 
the actions of one government will have consequences for the other, and many of the fields in which 
one unit concerns itself will cut across formal divisions of responsibility.15  Alternatively, neither 
central nor unit governments have hierarchical controls over the other, meaning neither can dictate to 
the other.16  
Further, as the definition above suggests, Canadian federalism requires judicial review, which must 
be taken into consideration when evaluating the environment within which each government operates. 
Each province has its own court system, with its own charter and a court of appeal at its peak, 
operating within the hierarchical Canadian court structure.  The hierarchical design of this structure 
allows cases that have travelled to the peak of the provincial court system to be elevated to the highest 
                                                
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Simeon, Richard. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.  Pg. 3
16 Ibid
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level in the country, the Supreme Court of Canada, which holds the final say on all judicial matters. 
The process of judicial review will inevitably have significant social, economic, and political 
implications for the decision-making process of each government.   
One of the most important documents that the Supreme Court of Canada relies on when making a 
decision on legislation is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter).  
Although the Canadian Charter was developed in order to restore, or increase, national unity, some 
provincial governments were wary of how these changes may affect their ability to legislate 
autonomously.  A number of provincial governments feared that the Charter could have potentially 
reduced their autonomy and provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to shift power away 
from the provincial sphere of authority to the federal sphere.  As Smithey points out, “the Charter 
symbolizes an elevation of the national over the provincial, and every time the Supreme Court 
exercises its Charter powers, it symbolically reinforces national unity over provincial diversity.”17
However, this is not the only reason provincial governments are suspicious of the Court. According to 
Russell, the Court “has a credibility problem because one side, the federal government, appoints them 
and constitutionally controls their institution.”18  This arrangement has led to provincial distrust of the 
Supreme Court, and the powers that the federal and provincial governments are often found wrestling 
over are derived from the British North American Act 1867, now the Constitution Act 1867.
The formal divisions of responsibility in Canada find their beginnings in the Constitution Act 
1867(Act).  The Act contains many important sections, but none more important than s. 91 and s. 92, 
the division of powers, which grants powers to each level of government in Canada.  S. 92 provides 
provincial governments exclusive powers in local affairs, thus not allowing for any interference from 
                                                
17 Smithey, Shannon.  “The Effects of the Canadian Supreme Court’s Charter Interpretation 
on Regional and Intergovernmental Tensions in Canada,” Publius.  The Journal of 
Federalism 26:2 (Spring 1996) Pg. 86
18 Russell.  Pg. 13
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the federal government in the provincial areas of jurisdiction.19  Due to this separation of powers, it 
has been said, “some degree of conflict between the two levels of government is probably best viewed 
as an endemic and almost universal condition.”20  
In many cases, federal-provincial conflict can be viewed as conflict between competing 
organizations.  An example of this can be found in the regionalized nature of Canada, as a particular 
sector of the economy may be largely concentrated within one province, exercising significant 
economic and political power within that province.  When this is coupled with the fact that there are a 
relatively small number of provinces in Canada, most of which are large, there is the potential that a 
determined province can influence federal policy or place obstacles in the way of federal initiatives.  
Alternatively, provincial governments may “seek to expand their revenues through equalization or 
abatement…or exclude the other level of government from functional areas of jurisdiction over which 
they have already staked a claim.”21  These examples demonstrate how conflict between the two 
levels of government can be viewed as conflict between competing organizations.  Further, a specific 
area of key competition/conflict between the two levels of government is in the sphere of health care.
One of the areas of jurisdiction granted by s.92 includes what has evolved into the current health 
care system.  Provincial regulation of hospitals is specifically referred to in s.92, while s.92(13) also 
covers property and civil rights, a section controlling the regulation of doctors.  This design has 
allowed provincial governments to develop and implement their own health care schemes, while use 
of the spending power by the federal government has provided an opportunity for the federal 
government to overcome constitutional limitations on its role in health care policy.  The spending 
power involves the transfer of money or tax points, rather than jurisdiction, towards programs such as 
                                                
19 British North American Act, 1867. http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/const/loireg/p1t1-1.html
(Accessed 1 November 2006)
20 Stevenson pg. 210
21 Ibid 213
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health care and education, and has become the main lever of federal influence in areas that are 
legislatively within provincial jurisdiction.22  
By making financial contributions to these provincial programs, the federal government could 
influence provincial policies and program standards.  While one view of the spending power is that 
the federal government is attempting to ensure a minimum acceptable level of services in different 
regions, the provincial governments take a different stance.  Provincial governments claim the federal 
government is unconstitutionally coercing provinces to participate in programs under the federal 
government’s guidelines.23  Regardless of provincial skepticism, the spending power of the federal 
government has historically played a role in the development of the Canadian health care system and 
remains an important source of resources for the provinces today.  
The provinces were originally against what they viewed as federal intrusion into provincial 
jurisdiction; however, inadequate hospital facilities led to both planning and construction grants being 
provided by the federal government.  These grants established the concept of federal-provincial cost 
sharing for health care services,24 and were a precursor to the federal government’s official role in 
health care, which was established through the enactment of the Canada Health Act.
The evolution of universal health care in Canada culminated with the passing of the Canada Health 
Act (CHA) in 1984, which received the unanimous consent of the House of Commons as well as the 
Senate.  The CHA set national conditions in health care that all provincial governments were required 
                                                
22 The Spending Power: Scope and Limitations.  Library of Parliament Online. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp272-e.htm#CONCLUSION (accessed 
on 26 March 2007)
23 ibid
24 Vayda, Eugene. "The Canadian Health System: An Overview." Journal of Public Health 
Policy 7(1986): 205-210 Pg. 205
15
to meet in order to qualify for federal transfers.25  Still, provincial governments possess the ability to 
opt-out of the CHA, but doing so would mean the loss of any funding provided by the federal 
government.  The level of assistance provided by the federal government makes opting-out of the 
CHA unpalatable for most provinces, thus guaranteeing uniform minimum-conditions across the 
country for health care.  
Consequently, the CHA and federal spending power have provided a role for the federal 
government in health care.  Provincial governments have relied on federal transfers in order to cover 
the cost of health care and without such funding, Canadians would probably not enjoy the universal 
health coverage they do today.  However, a desire for an increase in the Canada Health Transfer 
(CHT), the current program under which federal funds are transferred to the provinces to assist in the 
funding of health care, is consistently on the agenda of the Premiers in Canada.  As an implication of 
this, the federal government’s reluctance to provide more funds has often led to federal-provincial 
conflict.
However, the environment that both the federal and provincial governments are accustomed to 
operating in when dealing with health care may be altered in the Chaoulli case due to the federal 
government’s history of supporting universal health care.  If the federal government supports the 
position of the province of Québec, and respects its jurisdiction, then the traditional role of the federal 
government may change from adversary in the health care arena to supporter, thus altering the 
environment that both levels of government are accustomed to operating in.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court might replace the federal government as an intruder into provincial jurisdiction by hearing the 
Chaoulli case.  Since the provinces are protective of their autonomy, provincial governments could be 
                                                
25 Canada Health Act Overview.  Health Canada. http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-
cp/2002/2002_care-soinsbk4_e.html (Accessed October 22nd 2005)
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expected to react negatively to the Supreme Court interfering in an area that provincial governments 
feel is under their prerogative.
3.2 Factors Determining Governmental Behaviour
Determining the motives behind a government’s behaviour or action is not an easy task.  Many 
variables must be considered when determining these motives, and although it is impossible to know 
every thought or process behind a government’s action, variables such as a government’s goals and 
objectives, as well as its status should be considered.  Richard Simeon provides a list of explanatory 
variables that should be consulted when explaining the motives behind government decision-making 
including economic interests, ideology, and status goals.    
Economic Interests:  An important explanatory variable discussed by Simeon is economic interest.  
Of the two economic variables listed, rich versus poor and east versus west, only the rich versus poor 
distinction is useful in explaining the reactions of provincial governments to the Chaoulli decision.  
Economic interests arguably play a significant role in understanding provincial reactions to the 
Chaoulli decision.  For example, a rich province such as Alberta, which has been experiencing 
continual economic growth, may feel that there is a market for a greater role for private insurance in 
the health care system.  Since the population has seen an increase in prosperity, it is possible that 
there could be a rise in demand for better health care service, resulting in reforms to how health care 
is administered and how the government focuses its resources.  However, a province at the opposite 
end of the economic scale, such as PEI, which has been experiencing difficult economic situations 
over a long period of time, may have a population that cannot afford to pay for private insurance and, 
as such, the public demand for a publicly funded universal health care system may remain strong.  
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The level of provincial prosperity (which includes the wealth of not only provincial governments, but 
also citizens) undoubtedly has the potential to influence how a government may react to the decision 
in the Chaoulli case.       
The east versus west variable focuses mostly on traditional economic cleavages, such as the east 
being the centre for manufacturing and the west being the centre for natural resources, and the 
subsidy problems that have arisen from tradition regional differences.  The East/West variable has no 
applicability to the provincial reactions to the decision as there is no parallel between how the 
differing economies of the East/West may favour a specific mode of delivering health care, or that 
these economies would direct a province to react to the decision in any specific manner.  This leaves 
the rich versus poor variable as the only aspect of economic interests to potentially play a role in 
provincial reactions.
Ideology:  Simeon’s review of ideology focuses on federal-provincial conflict; however, only the 
second of the two basic elements of ideology outlined is central to understanding the reactions of 
provincial governments to the Chaoulli decision.  The first important element of ideology listed by 
Simeon includes a prescription relating to the nature of the political system, the proper balance of the 
governments within it, and the ways the decision process should operate.  The second element speaks 
to the substantive aspects, relating to the policy goals of the actors.26  When examining federal-
provincial conflict Simeon points out that “far more important than ideological ‘left-right’ differences 
are disparities in viewpoint about the basic nature of the federal system, the appropriate roles and 
powers of the governments within it, and the proper means of making joint decisions.”27  The most 
important example of these differences in viewpoints is the clash between most of English Canada, at 




both the federal and provincial level, and Québec.  Although this clash plays a critical role in how a 
number of policy decisions are developed at both the federal and provincial levels across Canada, it is
not the most important ideological factor in determining how a provincial government will behave 
when there is no existing conflict between provincial and federal governments.
The ideological ‘left-right’ variances that Simeon dismisses as being less important to the 
study of federal-provincial conflict may in fact be less important for Simeon’s study than the 
ideological prescription relating to the nature of the political system, as Simeon’s study focuses on 
government behaviour during conflict between the federal and provincial levels of government.  
However, this left-right difference may have the potential to play a substantive role in determining the 
behaviour of each provincial government in regards to their response to the Chaoulli decision.  The 
left-right ideological cleavage plays an important role in how governments operate, as many of their 
policies and perceptions about how governments should function are drawn from this cleavage.    
It can be assumed that a left-right ideological dimension can be found in most Western 
democracies.  Survey research has determined that in most Western democracies the majority of 
voters conceives of politics in such a fashion and can readily place themselves on some type of left-
right scale.28  Further, recent research suggests “although ideological cleavages are not as strongly 
related to class position as they once were, the left-right dimension remains a most significant, if not 
dominant cleavage in Western democracies,”29 and that “left-right ideological orientations serve as a 
                                                
28 Inglehart, Ronald, and Klingmann, Hans-Dieter (1976).  “Party identification, ideological 
preference and the left-right dimension among Western mass publics.”  In Ian Budge, Ivor 
Crewe, and Dennis Farlie (eds.). Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting 
and Party Competitions.  London: John Wiley & Sons.
29 Kim, HeeMin, Richard C. Fording. "Voter Ideology, the Economy, and the International 
Environment in Western Democracies, 1952-1989." Political Behaviour 23(2001): 53-73.  
Pg. 55
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basic reference point for voters’ choices of candidates/parties.”30  Since the left-right ideological 
divide is the most basic reference point for a voter, it can also be assumed that it is the most basic 
reference point for a politician.  Thus politicians, and therefore governments, create policies and take 
actions based on their ideological predisposition, as this lays out a path that politicians believe is the 
correct course to take, making ideology one of the potential prime motivators behind governmental 
responses to the Chaoulli decision.  
Status Goals:  The third explanatory variable that Simeon lists to explain government behaviour 
involves what he terms as “status goals.”  Simeon points out that all governments want to improve, or
at worst maintain, their status among the electorate.  When dealing with electoral considerations, 
Simeon points out that “here we come close to the heart of political competition in the federal 
system.”31  Although they do not compete in elections, eleven governments jointly govern the same 
population; therefore, there is a finite amount of credit to be claimed by each level of government.32  
This leads to another kind of competition, considering that the two levels of government are in a 
constant struggle to “gain credit, status and importance and avoid discredit and blame,”33 noting that 
much of this status is garnered through the delivery of popular programs.  Both levels of government 
compete for status in order to maintain high approval rates and ensure a good result for the party at 
the next election.  
The most relevant aspect of Simeon’s status goals variable, which could play a critical role in the 
current study, is that politicians are continuously attempting to improve their status among the 
                                                
30 Fuchs, Dieter, and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (1990).  “The left-right schema.”  In M. Kent 





electorate in order to gain votes.  Simeon’s study does not discuss in detail the role political 
calculation plays in governmental behaviour, however, Norris focuses her research on this variable in 
an effort to examine the level of importance the factor of political calculation is in government 
behaviour.
3.3 Political Calculation: Vote-Maximizing and Rational Choice Institutionalism
While undertaking a comprehensive analysis comparing voting behaviour across many different types 
of societies, including older and newer democracies, Pippa Norris discusses, in great depth, rational-
choice institutionalism, a theory which helps to demonstrate that political calculation is a prime 
motivator in governmental behaviour.  The core theoretical claim in rational-choice institutionalism is 
that “formal electoral rules generate important incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining 
political behaviour.”34  Electoral rules being defined as “the legislative framework governing 
elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statues, codes of 
conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized by law and enforceable by courts.”35  This theory 
helps to identify political calculation and describe its role as a prime motivator of governmental 
behaviour.
Political actors enter electoral races with the goal of being elected to a legislative body.  In a single 
member plurality system (SMP), this requires the political actor to receive more votes than any other 
competitor, although a majority is not required.  Rational-choice institutionalism predicts that the 
formal rules of the SMP system will produce a political actor who is essentially a vote-maximizer.  
The formal rules in the case of the SMP system are that the political actor must receive the most 
                                                
34 Norris, Pippa.  Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.  Pg. 7
35 Ibid
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votes, but is not required to win a majority of the votes in order to be the successful candidate.  The 
incentive shaped by the formal rules is gaining office, and behaviour required to do so is for the 
candidate to become a vote-maximizer.  Although political actors may vary in their reasons for 
attempting to gain public office, the Darwinian theory predicts that political actors who are not vote-
maximizers will become less common, because they will be less successful at gaining public office.36  
Thus, rational-choice institutionalism predicts that political actors will use political calculation when 
dealing with a policy choice in an attempt to maintain or gain public popularity.  
When reacting to the decision rendered in the Chaoulli case, rational-choice institutionalism 
predicts that one of the prime motivators behind provincial reactions may be political calculation.  
Provincial governments which might have an ideological predisposition in favour of expanding the 
private sector’s role in health care, or who did not implement an explicit ban on private insurance for 
publicly-insured services, may base their public reaction on what they perceive will be popular with 
the electorate in their province.  The theory of rational-choice institutionalism thus predicts that the 
provinces that are most likely to oppose the Chaoulli decision are those where public opinion is least 
supportive of the decision.
3.4 Public Opinion
Further to the argument made by Norris that political actors are vote-maximizers, and thus will 
respond to public opinion, it follows that governments will also be responsive to public opinion in the 
hope of performing well in the next election.  As noted by Key, “unless mass views have some place 
                                                
36 Ibid pg. 9
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in the shaping of policy, all the talk about democracy is nonsense,”37 however, the impact that public 
opinion has in Canadian society in reference to the actions of political actors is debatable.  The ideal 
manner in which democracy operates, as stated by Wright et al. is to have elections in which citizens 
have the opportunity to select leaders who “offer differing futures for government action.  Once 
elected, political leaders have incentives to be responsive to public preferences.”38   
Alternatively, politicians who are unresponsive to public opinion or initiate policies that prove 
unpopular can be replaced at the next election.  Of course, this is the ideal situation and a cynic may 
see the process differently, believing that once politicians are elected into office, they pay little 
attention to public opinion.  This perspective may include the idea that these politicians choose to 
pursue their own policies; motivated by the belief that since the voting public expects so very little 
from them in the first place, given their minimal attention to the political sphere, there is no need to 
make them a priority.  Yet, the actual performance of electoral democracy may fall somewhere 
between these two extremes.39
A review of the literature in the field of public opinion reveals that research has indicated that 
policies and government reactions are often shaped by public opinion.  Burstein suggests that on 
balance, what the evidence suggests is that “what the people want in those instances where the people 
care(s) enough about an issue to make its wishes known” the government does.40  In today’s society, 
where a new opinion poll appears to be released daily, governments often have ready access to the 
desires held by the public, and are able to determine how strong the public deems a certain issue to 
                                                
37 Key, V.O., Jr. 1961.  Public opinion and American democracy.  New York: Knopf.  Pg. 7
38 Wright, Erikson, and McIver.  Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American 
States.  American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1987) pp. 980-1001.  Pg. 981
39 Ibid
40 Burstein, Paul.  1981.  The Sociology of democratic politics and government.  In Ralph H. 
Turner and James F. Short, Jr., eds. Annual Review of Sociology.  Vol7. Palo Alto: Annual 
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be.  With this knowledge, governments have the opportunity to create policies that are consistent with 
popular belief.  In the case of provincial government responses to the Chaoulli decision, it is likely 
that provincial governments would have access to public opinion on the ideas involved in the trial.  
These opinions could potentially help shape each government’s response considering that recent 
literature suggests that governments pay close attention to public opinion when constructing policies 
or public responses.  Although most research has focused on government response to public opinion 
at the federal level, Wright, Erikson, and McIver have also examined such phenomena at the sub-
national level of the system.     
Wright, Erikson, and McIver performed a study that aids in identifying the potential importance of 
public opinion on government reactions.  Wright et al. challenged the traditional manner of studying 
the impact of public opinion on policy by shifting the focus from its effect on the federal government 
to its effect on policy in most of the US states.  The authors felt that “(W)ith 50 separate state publics 
and 50 sets of state policies, the states provide an ideal laboratory for comparative research.”41  The 
change in focus makes the authors’ study more closely related to the current examination, as it 
focuses on public opinion across sub-national governments in a federal system.  
Their study discovered that across an impressive range of policies there was a strong correlation 
between public opinion and government policy choice.  The authors posit that political mechanisms 
such as elections tend to create a set of shared values and beliefs among the electorate and their 
representatives.  People tend to vote in favour of individuals that share similar beliefs and values 
while rejecting those who do not.  Recruiting candidates from the same constituencies as the voters 
they represent should translate into a shared set of ideas and values, as electorates tend to elect 
legislators that want the same things they do.  Of course, legislators also act based on public opinion 
                                                
41 Wright et al.  Pg. 981
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for fear of electoral repercussions.42  The demonstrated role of public opinion on policy decisions by 
Wright et al. may help explain the reactions provided by each provincial government to the Chaoulli 
decision.  
Assuming governments are responsive to public opinion, as is suggested by recent literature, public 
opinion on the Chaoulli decision could play a role in how each province reacted to the decision.  
Public opinion in each province is represented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, as each relates to a separate 
question regarding the verdict in the case.  Table 1 displays the net public opinion in favour of 
Chaoulli. 
                                                
42 Wright et al. Pg. 997
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Canada Atlantic Quebec Ontario MB/SK Alberta BC
NET PUBLIC OPINION  IN FAVOUR OF CHAOULLI 
(Indexed to Canadian Average)
  
Source:  Supplied by Professor Gerard W. Boychuk, University of Waterloo.
The data in Table 1 demonstrate that public opinion on the ruling varied across the provinces, with 
support in the Atlantic provinces being the lowest, while support in British Columbia was the highest.  
Based on these results, a hypothesis could be extrapolated predicting that the provinces most likely to 
oppose the decision are those in which public opinion is least supportive of the decision.  In this 
scenario, one would expect provincial government reaction against the ruling to be the most 
prominent in the Atlantic provinces, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan given their disapproval.  Further, a 
negative reaction in the British Columbia and Québec is least likely due to the public’s approval in 
each province, with Ontario and Alberta falling somewhere in between.  
Table 2 displays the net public opinion based on strongly agreeing or disagreeing with the decision.  
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Canada Atlantic Quebec Ontario MB/SK Alberta BC
NET PUBLIC OPINION (STRONGLY 
AGREE/DISAGEE) IN FAVOUR OF CHAOULLI 
(Indexed to Canadian Average)
Source:  Supplied by Professor Gerard W. Boychuk, University of Waterloo.
This table presents a different perspective of public opinion than that offered in Table 1 as public 
opinion in Alberta is clearly more supportive than in any other province, while public opinion is 
clearly the least supportive in Ontario than any other province, with the remaining provinces falling 
somewhere in between.  Public opinion viewed from this angle predicts that Ontario would have a 
high probability of opposing the decision, while Alberta would have the lowest probability of 
opposing the decision, leaving the remaining provinces, relative to Alberta and Ontario, to have a 
medium probability of opposing the decision.    
Table 3 examines a different aspect of the decision, focusing on the actual design of healthcare, 
rather than merely on agreement or disagreement with the decision.  Table 3 displays public opinion 
in each province based on whether a patient should be allowed to pay for insurance when timely 
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access is not provided in the public system.  The table displays both the net opinion and the net 
strongly agree-strongly disagree opinion.
















BC/Terri. Alberta MB/SK Ontario Quebec Atlantic Canada
PATIENT ALLOWED TO PAY/INSURE, 2005
(When Timely Access Not Provided in Public System)
Disagree-Agree
Disagree Strongly-Agree Strongly
Source:  Supplied by Professor Gerard W. Boychuk, University of Waterloo.
From the data presented in Table 3, a hypothesis predicting that provinces are reacting to provincial 
public opinion in respect of allowing third party insurance where services are not offered in a timely 
manner could be generated.  Public opinion in this table presents a different expectation than the 
previous two tables, as British Columbia appears to be the province with the highest opposition to 
such a change to the healthcare system with Québec being the least opposed.  Thus, public opinion 
polls have presented three different expectations of government reactions to the decision, which will 
be outlined in further detail in the following chapter.  There will be an analysis completed on each to 
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determine which of the hypotheses is the best predictor of provincial reactions to the Chaoulli
decision.  
Reviewing recent literature regarding the different aspects of the environment in which the 
provinces operate in, as well as some of the variables motivating politicians and governments, has 
created expectations of how each provincial government should react to the decision.  The following 
chapter outlines how each provincial government is expected to react due to their current legislative 
scheme, their position as a provincial government, their ideological predisposition towards privatized 




The verdict delivered by Supreme Court in the Chaoulli case has the potential to change the manner 
in which a number of provincial governments administer health care.   Although the decision 
currently only applies to Québec, a number of provincial governments have implemented similar 
bans, and the verdict handed down by the Court could lead to Chaoulli-like challenges within these 
provinces.  When the top court in the country hands down a decision affecting the most popular social 
program in the country, it is expected that provincial governments administering this program will 
publicly react.  Based on the history of protecting provincial jurisdiction, current provincial law 
regarding private financing in the health care system, provincial ideology, and the influence public 
opinion holds over each government, it should be possible to predict how each province will react.  
The manner in which each government reacts should aid in answering the central question of what 
explains how provincial governments have reacted to the Chaoulli decision.  
In order to answer this question, four hypotheses have been developed and will be tested, with their 
results helping to establish the best predictor of government reactions to the Chaoulli decision.  The 
four hypotheses are: 1) All provincial governments will react negatively to the decision because 
elected provincial governments will tend to disagree in principle with the Court making decisions on 
matters that legislators see as their own prerogative; 2) The further a province moves along the 
restriction scale43, the more vigorously it should oppose the decision; 3) provincial governments that 
are more ideologically predisposed to the privatization of health care will welcome the decision; 4) 
provincial reactions will be driven by public opinion.     
                                                
43 The Restriction Scale will be explained in detail when viewing Figure 3 below.
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Hypothesis #1: The first hypothesis predicts that all provincial governments will react negatively to 
the decision because elected provincial governments will tend to disagree in principle with the Court 
making decisions on matters that legislators see as their own prerogative.  Since Confederation, 
provincial governments have believed that matters falling under provincial jurisdiction should be 
legislated only by the provincial assembly, and should not be subject to modification by any outside 
entity.  The “Provincial Rights Movement,” which began shortly after Confederation, was the 
initiation of provincial governments to strengthen their power and was based on two principal claims: 
first, it stood for an expansive understanding of provincial autonomy; and second, it viewed the 
constitution as a set of formal rules and principles largely independent of broader considerations of 
liberal democratic theory.44  Although it may have been worded differently than how Madison had 
defined federalism, the substance of the Confederation proposal reflected a comprehension of the 
Madisonian understanding of the legal basis of federalism.  Thus, Section 92 of the British North 
American Act would be written to give the provincial governments “exclusive” authority in local 
affairs, therefore not allowing interference from the federal government and creating autonomous 
political societies.45  
Section 92 was a necessary component of the BNA Act.  This section provides the “guarantees for 
local institutions and local laws, which are insisted upon by so many in the provinces”46, a feeling 
echoed in modern day Canada, as the 1990’s saw the growth of the Reform Party, which partly 
focused on restoring, or gaining power for provincial governments in the West.  Although the 
Canadian Charter was developed in order to restore, or increase, national unity, some provincial 
governments were wary of how these changes may affect their ability to legislate autonomously.  A 
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number of provincial governments feared that the Charter could have potentially reduced their 
autonomy and provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to shift power away from the 
provinces to the federal government.  However, this is not the only reason provincial governments are 
suspicious of the Court, as it is appointed by the federal government, thus increasing the likelihood of 
Justices with a centralist, rather than decentralist view appointed.  This arrangement has led to 
provincial distrust of the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the Chaoulli decision represents an occurrence that provincial governments have 
struggled to prevent since Confederation: an outside entity modifying or rescinding provincial law.  
Although losing his case in two lower courts, Dr. Chaoulli was able to have the case heard before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, eventually winning a decision striking down Québec law.  The decision 
currently only applies to Québec.  However, due to the provinces’ struggle to increase their 
autonomy, and their distrust of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is expected that all provincial 
governments will react negatively to the Court interfering in an area provincial governments feel is 
solely under their prerogative.  Tables 4 and 5 demonstrates the predicted outcome for the testing of 
the first hypothesis:
Table 4: Predicted Reactions to Court Interference in Provincial Jurisdiction (Dichotomous 
Scale)
Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X X X X X
Neutral
Table 5: Predicted Reactions to Court Interference in Provincial Jurisdiction (Relative Scale)
Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.




Hypothesis #2: The second hypothesis is based on a government’s law and predicts that the further 
a province moves across the restriction scale, based on the potential of a similar ruling in each 
province, the more vigorously a province should oppose the decision, while those who do not move 
should react neutrally or positively.  
In order to determine the predicted reactions of each provincial government, an examination of 
how each provincial government regulates physicians must be mapped out.  Figure 1 below maps out 
how strict each provincial government is in the regulation of private insurance coverage for opted-out 
physicians, while Figure 2 maps out the regulations of private insurance coverage for opted-in 
physicians, leaving Figure 3 to map out the potential movement for opted-out physicians after the 
Chaoulli decision.  These tables will be used to create a restriction scale47 that will aid in determining 
the potential effects of the decision in each province.
The restriction scale has been created to designate a point-value based on how each provincial 
government regulates private financing of publicly-insured services.  Provincial governments 
implementing the most restrictive measures receive a score of 1, with the score increasing as each 
government becomes more relaxed in its restrictive measures.  This scale allows for the examination 
of current law and to draw a simple picture comparing each provincial government’s level of 
restriction on private insurance.  This information is then used in predicting the potential movement 
each government may have, if a successful court challenge striking down an explicit ban were to 
occur in that province, thus providing crucial information for this study.
By using the restriction scale to determine the positions of the provincial governments prior to the 
Chaoulli decision, further examination can aid in predicting each province’s position after the 
decision.  Therefore, this information helps to determine how high a province’s restriction score 
                                                
47 The restriction scale begins on the left with all provinces having explicit bans scoring a 1, 
and continues to column four indicating no restrictions, which earns a province a score of 4.
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would be if there was a similar challenge resulting in the striking down of a provincial ban, allowing 
us to establish which provincial governments potentially have the most at stake in the case.  Mapping 
out each province’s position on the restriction scale prior to the Chaoulli decision provides a solid 
starting point for predicting how provinces will react
Before proceeding to evaluate positions and potential restriction scores, there must be an 
examination of how each provincial government regulates physicians.  Provinces regulate physicians 
that operate both within and outside of the system.  There are many avenues for a province in regards 
to regulating physicians, and each province varies on their approach, however, through examining 
each government’s method, it appears that provinces vary more on regulating opted-out physicians 
than they do for opted-in physicians.  The regulations for both opted-in and opted-out physicians are 
examined below. 
Opted-Out Physicians 
Most provincial governments have suppressed the growth of private insurance for publicly-funded 
services for opted-out physicians.  Prior to the Chaoulli decision there were a wide range of ways 
provincial governments had limited the opportunity for, or the availability of, third-party insurers for 
publicly-insured services, including regulating private insurance, regulating billing practices, and 
regulating fees.  An examination of the method used by each province to regulate private funding of 
publicly-insured services for opted-out physicians is necessary in order to determine where each 
province stands in regards to how they regulate third-party insurance for publicly insured services.  
This information will help to predict the reaction the provincial government will have to the Chaoulli
decision, based on their movement along the restriction scale.    
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The ability for private insurance companies to fund publicly-insured medical services is the aspect 
of the Chaoulli case that has the most direct implication for provincial governments.  The potential 
for private insurance to grow in a province is determined by the degree of the availability of such 
services.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, six Canadian provinces (BC, Alberta, Manitoba, 
Ontario, Québec, and PEI) had a ban on private insurance for publicly-insured services for opted-out 
physicians.  Three of the remaining four48 (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan) attempt 
to hinder the development of private insurance in a variety of ways.  Of the five provincial 
governments implementing explicit bans, Ontario and PEI have measures in place that would limit the 
scope of private insurance in the absence of an explicit ban,49 thus demonstrating even further 
variance in methods used to regulate opted-out physicians. 
The three provinces not implementing an explicit ban on opted-out physicians differ in the 
regulations regarding non-participating physicians.  In Nova Scotia, fees that physicians are allowed 
to charge are limited to those set in the provincial fee schedule and the fees are reimbursed to the 
patient.  By regulating private insurance in this manner, the government has removed any room, and 
thus any incentive, for private insurance to develop.  Of the three provinces without an explicit ban, 
Nova Scotia appears to be the strictest in attempting to limit the potential growth of private insurance.  
New Brunswick and Saskatchewan do not limit the amount that non-participating physicians can bill 
a patient, thus creating room and incentive, for doctors to provide faster/better service, developing an 
atmosphere for private insurance to grow.
In both Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, opted-out physicians are allowed to bill patients above 
the provincial fee schedule.  However, if this occurs, the government withdraws any public coverage, 
                                                
48 Newfoundland and Labrador currently has no restrictions on private financing of publicly-
insured services.
49 Boychuk.  Pg. 11
35
forcing the patient to absorb the full cost and thereby leading to the creation of a market for private 
insurance.  The lone province without any restrictions, Newfoundland and Labrador, allows opted-out 
physicians to set their own fees above the provincial fee schedule, while providing funding for those 
services up to the amount listed in the fee schedule50.  This design creates a gap in the cost for the 
service and thus, an area in which private insurance may flourish by providing insurance to fill such 
gaps.      
Figure 1: Regulation of Private Insurance Coverage, Opted-Out Physicians
PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF OPTED-OUT PHYSICIAN SERVICES
None High
Explicit Ban Ban on Differential 
Fees
Withdrawal of Public 
Coverage
No Restrictions
 BC  Nova Scotia  New Brunswick  Newfoundland and 
Labrador





Source: Boychuk, Gerard W. "Provincial Approaches to Funding Health Services in the Post-
Chaoulli Era." CPSA June: (2006): Appendix Table 1
Opted-In Physicians
The four provincial governments that do not implement an explicit ban on private insurance also 
differ in terms of their method of regulating participating physicians.  As pointed out by Boychuk, 
“Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador all prohibit opted-in physicians from 
                                                
50 Ibid Pg. 9
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billing patients directly, and as a result, also implicitly ban opted- in physicians from charging 
differential fees or ‘extra-billing.’”51  By using this prohibition, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland and Labrador basically eliminate any market for privatization and leave little room for 
the private financing of services.  The market that the three governments aim to eliminate can be seen 
in New Brunswick, which allows opted-in physicians to bill above the provincial fee schedule, but 
when this is done, withdraws public coverage.  Boychuk also notes “PEI also allows all physicians to 
bill above the provincial rate schedule but withdraws public coverage for such services.  Again, this 
regulation is superfluous in terms of its effect on private insurance in PEI as the latter is explicitly 
banned.52  Therefore, there is the opportunity for participating physicians to provide publicly-insured 
services under private insurance, but there is no public subsidization of those services.  
                                                
51 Ibid pg. 10
52 Ibid
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Figure 2: Regulation of Private Funding for Publicly-Insured Medical Services, Opted-In 
Physicians
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Source: Boychuk, Gerard W. "Provincial Approaches to Funding Health Services in the Post-
Chaoulli Era." CPSA June: (2006): Appendix Table 1
Among the provinces, the variation in the approaches used to regulate private insurance for opted-
in physicians, demonstrated in Figure 2, are not as wide ranging as the approaches used to regulate 
private insurance for opted-out physicians.  New Brunswick is the one province that greatly deviates 
from the norm in this instance.  The wide variation in approaches that the provinces take when 
regulating private insurance makes it difficult to anticipate the overall effect that the Chaoulli
decision could potentially have across Canada.  This is because some provincial governments have 
additional measures that would limit the scope of private insurance, while others have measures that 
would make it extremely difficult for private insurance to flourish (Ontario and PEI).  Some 
provincial governments have less stringent measures that would not restrict the growth of private 
insurance to the same degree as an explicit ban (e.g. British Columbia, Alberta and Québec) while 
Manitoba, which has an explicit ban but no additional measures should it be struck down, creates a 
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situation in which private insurance could flourish.53   Mapping out the position of provincial 
governments on the restriction scale prior to the decision helps to develop expectations as to how 
each provincial government will react.  In order to continue building this picture, attention is now 
turned to the positions of the provinces after the Chaoulli decision
4.1 Post-Chaoulli
Following the Supreme Court decision in the Chaoulli case, the health care strategy of a number of 
provinces could change significantly.  Having one public insurer allows for equal access to all 
citizens, regardless of income, and in order to change this, a challenger would have to convince a 
court that waiting lists are too long and present a danger to life.  Post-Chaoulli, the provincial 
governments implementing explicit bans on private insurance for publicly insured services could 
potentially face litigation similar to that seen in Québec, and if successful, these challenges could 
fundamentally change the manner in which provincial governments administer health care schemes.  
Thus, evaluating the potential movement for a provincial government in the instance of a similar 
challenge to the province’s explicit ban will help predict the type of reaction each provincial 
government will have to the decision.  Each provincial government’s predicted change, due to a 
successful Chaoulli-like challenge, is shown in Figure 3.  
                                                
53 Ibid pg. 11
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Figure 3: Regulation of Private Insurance Coverage, Opted-Out Physicians
POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the direction along the restriction graph that provinces with an explicit ban 
would move if such a ban were struck down by the courts.  The solid text demonstrates where the 
province currently lies on the restriction scale, while the shadowed text is used to demonstrate the 
position the province will take on the scale if the law is struck down.  For example, Ontario and PEI 
would continue to maintain a restriction level of 1 due to contingency and superfluous law already in 
place in each province, while Alberta, BC, Manitoba and Québec would all find themselves with 
higher scores. 
Examination of Figure 3 predicts that provincial governments with a ban should have a higher 
probability of opposing the decision, while governments without such a ban will react less 
strenuously and have a low probability of opposing the decision.  Furthermore, Figure 3 also predicts 
that the higher that a government is on the restriction scale the greater the probability that it will 
oppose the decision.  For example, Manitoba would be considered to have a medium probability of 
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opposing the decision because it moved only one place on the scale while British Columbia would be 
considered to have a high probability of opposing the decision because it moved two places on the 
scale.   
4.2 Evaluation of Predicted Provincial Movement
Alberta, British Columbia, Québec & Manitoba
Like Québec, Alberta has a law banning private insurance for publicly insured medical services, 
found in section 26 of the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, which dates back to the origins of 
medicare in 1969.54  As is the case in all provinces in Canada, having one public insurer allows for 
equal access to all citizens, regardless of income and in order to change this, the challenger will have 
to convince a judge that waiting lists are too long and a danger to life.  Ironically, that may be harder 
to do in Alberta than Québec, given its well-funded public system and the high economic status of the 
province.  However, if such a challenge arises and is successful, Alberta is projected to move from a 1 
on the restriction scale to a 3, a significant change in restriction.  Due to this fact, one would assume 
that the government of Alberta would be against a similar successful challenge, with Premier Klein’s 
reaction falling in line with that of the second hypothesis, that is, to react negatively.     
British Columbia’s situation is very similar to that of Alberta, as it currently has a ban on private 
insurance for publicly insured services.  Like Alberta, a similar successful challenge in BC would 
project a push from a restriction level of 1 to a restriction level of 3.  Such an outcome would 
                                                
54 Marchildon, Gregory P.  “Private Insurance for Medicare: Policy and Trajectory in the 
Four Western Provinces” Access To Care, Access to Justice.  Toronto:  University of 
Toronto Press, 2005.  Pg. 434
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significantly change the manner in which health care is delivered in BC, and according to hypothesis 
two, such a change would lead to a negative public reaction by the BC government. 
In Québec’s case, the Chaoulli decision deals directly with a Québec law and acting as the 
defendant in the case clearly demonstrates that the government of Québec would be against the 
verdict delivered by the Supreme Court.  Prior to the decision, Québec had an explicit ban on private 
insurance for publicly insured services, putting them at a restriction level of 1, however, the verdict 
handed down by the Supreme Court has projected that Québec will be pushed to a restriction level of 
3.  Therefore, based on the movement in the restriction scale, the second hypothesis predicts the 
government of Québec to react negatively to the Chaoulli decision.  
Finally, the Manitoba government’s situation is similar to but not the same as that of Alberta, BC, 
and Québec.  The similarity is that Manitoba also has a ban on private insurance for publicly insured 
services; however, the difference between its situation and that of the governments of Alberta and BC 
is that a similar successful challenge in Manitoba would move Manitoba only from a restriction level 
of 1 to a projected restriction level of 2.  However, the second hypothesis predicts that provincial 
governments with an explicit ban who would find an increase in their restriction level score, would 
react negatively to the case, regardless of how high the increase.  The fact that the government of 
Manitoba will move a shorter distance across the scale than Alberta, BC, and Québec, dictates, 
according to the second hypothesis, that the government of Manitoba has a medium probability of 
opposing the decision.   Thus, the government of Manitoba’s explicit ban and projected movement on 
the restriction scale predicts that the government has a medium probability of opposing the decision. 
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Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, Ontario & 
PEI 
Six provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, Ontario 
and PEI are projected to have their health care strategy unaffected by a similar outcome to a challenge 
such as the Chaoulli case in their province.  Currently, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and 
Saskatchewan allow for private insurance with some restrictions, with Newfoundland and Labrador 
being the only province with no restrictions.  However, both Ontario and PEI do implement an 
explicit ban.  
Ontario is one of the six provincial governments that implement an explicit ban on private 
insurance for publicly insured services.  However, due to Ontario having contingencies in place, 
including the Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act 2004, Ontario is projected to remain at a 
restriction level of 1 regardless if a similar ruling were to occur in Ontario.  Similarly, PEI has a 
contingency law in place that would prevent a move further along the restriction scale, putting them 
in the same position as Ontario.   Due to the lack of movement along the restriction scale, neither 
Ontario nor PEI would increase their restriction score.  Although not all six provinces have the same 
restriction score, each would maintain its current score.  According to the second hypothesis, this 
would indicate that all of these provinces would have a low probability of opposing the decision.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in the Chaoulli case could significantly alter the health care 
strategies of some provincial governments, while not causing much or any change in others.  Based 
on this hypothesis, there should be very differing reactions between the provincial governments, 
based on their current policies.  Table 6 indicates how each provincial government is expected to 
publicly react to the decision.
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Table 6: Predicted Public Reactions of Each Provincial Government According to the Second 
Hypothesis
Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.




X X X X X X
    Hypothesis #3: The third hypothesis predicts that provincial governments that are more 
ideologically predisposed to the privatization of health care will welcome the decision.  Privatized 
health care occurs in most provinces.  It occurs in the form of health care provided outside the realm 
of provincial insurance programs, such as physiotherapy, dental, and in some cases, optometry.  
However, some provincial governments have pushed the envelope further than others, allowing for 
the operation of private clinics that perform services covered under the public health care plan, such 
as hip and knee replacements, to exist within its provincial borders.  The operation of these private 
clinics provides a provincial government with the designation of ideologically predisposed to the 
privatization of health care.55 Using this guideline, each province is then placed in two separate 
categories, those that are not ideologically predisposed to privatization (Newfoundland and Labrador, 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Ontario, PEI, and Saskatchewan) and those that are 
(Alberta, BC, and Québec).  In the case of provincial governments that are not considered 
ideologically predisposed to the privatization of health care, the third hypothesis predicts that these 
governments will react negatively to the decision. 
                                                
55 The indicator used to determine whether a provincial government is considered 
ideologically predisposed to an increase in the role of the private sector in the delivery of 
health care, is the number of private clinics that government allows to operate within its 
borders.  There are other factors that could be considered, such as rhetorical support, 
however, these are more difficult to measure, and thus potentially less reliable.  The number 
of private clinics in operation is easily measured and thus the indicator for this study.
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British Columbia is an example of one province that employs various private clinics, such as the 
Cambie Centre.  The Cambie Centre provides patients with health care services covered under the 
public health care scheme, among them such services as hip replacements, which is one of the most 
backlogged procedures in most provinces.  Private clinics such as these have opened and are currently 
in operation in BC, Alberta, and Québec56.  By allowing these clinics to open and circumvent the 
public health plan, these provincial governments have signalled that they are open to the growth of 
private health care in their province, or at the very least, are ideologically predisposed to an increase 
in privatization.  A ruling such as the Chaoulli decision opens the door for these governments to 
welcome private health care into a more mainstream role, as it now has affirmation from the Supreme 
Court.  Based on the predisposition of these provincial governments, the third hypothesis predicts that 
these provincial governments will welcome the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chaoulli case.  
Tables 7 and 8 indicate how each provincial government, both ideologically predisposed and not 
ideologically predisposed, should react to the verdict in the Chaoulli decision.
Table 7: Predicted Reaction of Each Provincial Government According to the Third Hypothesis 
(Dichotomous Scale)
Reaction Alb.  BC   Man.  Nfld.   NB   NS    Ont. PEI  Que.  Sask.  
Negative X X X X X X X
Neutral/Positive X X X
Table 8: Predicted Reaction of Each Provincial Government According to the Third Hypothesis 
(Relative Scale)
Reaction Alb.  BC   Man.  Nfld.   NB   NS     Ont.  PEI   Que.  Sask.  
Negative X X X X X X X
Neutral
Positive X X X
                                                
56 See Appendix B for a complete list of private clinics in operation in Alberta, BC, 
Manitoba, and Quebec. 
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Hypothesis #4:  Finally, the fourth hypothesis is that provincial reaction will be driven by public 
opinion.  The predicted outcome is that provincial governments should respond to the Chaoulli
decision in a manner that reflects public opinion within each province.  Due to various polls depicting 
public opinion on this decision in numerous ways, the fourth hypothesis has been divided into a 
subset of three separate hypotheses all of which pertain to public opinion.  Each of these hypotheses 
will predict a government’s likelihood of opposing the decision as high/medium/low, in relation to 
the other provinces.  
The first of the subset, or hypothesis #4a, predicts that the provinces that are most likely to oppose 
the decision are provinces in which public opinion is least supportive of the decision.  As previously 
shown in Table 1, support for the decision varied across provinces with the Atlantic provinces, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan being the least supportive of the decision; British Columbia and Québec 
being most supportive of the decision; and Alberta and Ontario falling somewhere in between.  Thus, 
if hypothesis #4a is correct, relative to the other provinces, there is a high chance that all of the 
Atlantic provinces, Manitoba and Saskatchewan will oppose the decision; a medium chance that both 
Alberta and Ontario will oppose the decision; and there is a low chance that British Columbia or 
Québec will oppose the decision.
Hypothesis #4b predicts that Ontario would have the highest probability of opposing the decision, 
while Alberta would have the lowest probability of opposing the decision.  When public opinion is 
viewed relative to Alberta and Ontario, the hypothesis predicts that the remaining provinces would all 
have a medium probability of opposing the decision.  Table 2 focuses on net strong opinions rather 
than only the net opinions (as shown in Table 1), leading to a change in perspective of public opinion 
in each province.
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Finally, hypothesis #4c predicts that provinces are reacting to provincial public opinion concerning 
allowing third party insurance where services are not offered in a timely manner.  Hypothesis #4c 
focuses on the actual design of healthcare rather than agreement or disagreement with the decision.  
Table 3 displays public opinion in each province based on whether a patient should be allowed to pay 
for insurance when timely access is not provided in the public system, and shows both the net opinion 
and the net strongly disagree-strongly agree opinion. Public opinion in this table presents a different 
expectation than the previous two tables.  In comparison to the other provinces, Québec, Manitoba, 
and Saskatchewan have the lowest probability of opposing the decision; Ontario has a medium 
chance of opposing the decision, while the Atlantic provinces, Alberta, and British Columbia have the 
highest probability of opposing the decision.  Table 9 indicates how each provincial government 
should react to the decision based on the predictions made in hypothesis #4a, #4b, and #4c.     
Table 9: Predicted Reactions Based on Public Opinion*
Hypothesis 
#4a
Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.










High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
*High and Medium probability is considered a negative response for the dichotomous scale 
scoring while Low is considered positive.
However, due to a weakness in the design of hypothesis #2, eight multi-stage hypotheses have been 
constructed.  The multi-stage hypotheses are constructed in order to determine whether combining the 
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second hypothesis with hypotheses #3 and #4 could increase the predictive capacity of the 
hypotheses.  The weakness in the design of hypothesis #2 is that the hypothesis cannot differentiate 
between positive and neutral reactions and combining one of the remaining hypotheses in order to aid 
in predicting whether a province will react positively or neutrally could increase the overall predictive 
capacity of a hypothesis.  Thus, the second hypothesis has been combined with hypothesis #3 and #4, 
first with the second hypothesis acting as the first stage before application of the third and fourth
hypotheses in the first four multi-stage hypotheses, followed by the second hypothesis performing as 
the second stage in the remaining four. The logic behind such a design would be that provinces may 
first determine their reaction based on how significant the changes would be for the existing system, 
then, if the changes do not dictate a negative reaction, they have latitude to consider their ideological 
position or public opinion.
Table 10 lists how each of the four original hypotheses have been combined to create the multi-
stage hypotheses.











The weakness in the design of the second hypothesis forces each of the hypotheses to be tested 
twice.  As previously noted, the second hypothesis cannot differentiate between a positive and neutral 
reaction and thus folds both of these reactions together into one category.  Due to this limitation, each 
hypothesis is tested on a dichotomous scale, with each hypothesis having its positive and neutral 
predictions folded into one category, with a correct prediction scoring a 0 and an incorrect prediction 
scoring a 2.  Following the first test of each hypothesis, hypothesis #1, #3 and #4 will be tested using 
a relative scale that measures the distance between the prediction and the actual outcome.  On this 
scale, and in order to maintain a comparable set of scores for all of the hypotheses, the relative scale 
will assign a 0 for a correct prediction, a 1 for a prediction which is incorrect by one column 
(predicting a positive reaction for a province that has a neutral reaction), and a 2 for the prediction 
that is incorrect by two columns (a negative prediction where a positive reaction occurs).   
Each provincial government’s reaction is tested against each hypothesis, the results recorded and 
compared, leading to the discovery of which of the hypotheses is the most accurate predictor of 
provincial reactions to the Chaoulli decision.
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Chapter 5
Provincial Reactions to the Supreme Court Decision in the Chaoulli
Case
In order to answer the question of what explains how provincial governments have reacted to the 
Chaoulli decision, hypotheses have been developed on how governments are expected to act or react 
to different facets of the decision.  In order to determine if these hypotheses are correct, each one 
must be tested individually, the results compiled, and then analyzed to establish a pattern of reactions 
that should help explain how provincial governments reacted to the decision. The reactions of the 
provincial governments are drawn from four sources, the media, legislature debates, court documents, 
and, where possible, questionnaires answered by government representatives.  
The media being surveyed will be a major newspaper within each province, and in order to provide 
a national scope, The Globe and Mail and The National Post will be examined to supplement 
provincial newspapers.  The legislature debates under examination will cover the first two weeks of 
debates following the verdict being handed down by the Court, allowing for those legislatures not in 
session at the time of the verdict to be examined when the legislature returns from recess.  A complete 
survey of these sources provides the proper scope and depth to test each hypothesis.  Testing the 
reactions of each government in a variety of ways allows for independent streams of evidence to be 
combined, analyzed, and will provide an answer to what lead the provincial governments to react in 
the manner in which they did to the Supreme Court decision in the Chaoulli case
This chapter focuses on the reaction that each provincial government delivered in response to the 
decision, and displays each reaction on a province-by-province basis.  In the following chapter, the 
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provincial government reactions will be analyzed and compared to the predictions made by each 
hypothesis in order to determine which provincial governments reacted in the predicted manner. 
Alberta: It is well known across Canada that the government of Alberta, and its leader, Premier 
Ralph Klein, have been in favour of expanding the role of the private sector in their health care 
system for some time.  When the decision was delivered, Klein immediately gave the response the 
public had been anticipating. The Premier’s Office issued a public statement the day the verdict was 
delivered, and Premier Klein also took the liberty of writing an editorial piece, jointly published in the 
Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal a month later, demonstrating the Premier’s satisfaction 
with the decision.  The press release states:  
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that Canadians have the 
right to timely access to health services.  This includes ruling that 
prohibiting patients from using private financing and private 
insurance where wait times are excessive, violates the Charter of 
Rights.  The Alberta government is very pleased with this decision.  
Premier Klein fully supports any change that will allow Canadians 
more choice in getting timely access to the health care services they 
want.57
The press release clearly points out that the Alberta government is pleased with the decision and that 
Klein supports the change that the decision made by the Court will make.  
The Alberta government was the only government implementing an explicit ban at the time of the 
decision that reacted positively to the verdict handed down by the Court.  As pointed out by journalist 
Jason Markusoff, “While other provincial governments reacted with anger, frustration or confusion 
Thursday to the Supreme Court of Canada’s rebuke of the nation’s medicare system, Alberta 
                                                
57 Alberta Government. News Release, “Premier’s Statement, Supreme Court Chaoulli 
Decision” (9 June 2005)
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expressed delight”58. Klein also saw the decision as a victory against those in favour of a single-tier 
universal health care system who, he believes, create myths to scare citizens of the idea of 
privatization “In rendering their judgment, the Supreme Court also took special care to demolish the 
myths that the defenders of the status quo have been telling Canadians for years.”59  However, the 
ringing endorsement provided by the Alberta government towards the Court was out of character.
In the past, the government of Alberta has proven to be unwavering in its rejection of the idea of 
judicial policy-making.  Alberta has long been against the Court involving itself in the area of policy-
making, demonstrated most clearly during the gay marriage debates, which ultimately led to the 
implementation of the Civil Marriage Act.60   Alberta has maintained that areas under provincial 
jurisdiction should be reserved for the legislature, and Premier Klein even considered invoking the 
Notwithstanding Clause, which he later found would be of no use, as the legislation fell under the 
federal government’s purview.  Still, in the instance of the Chaoulli case, the government of Alberta 
finally gives a ringing endorsement for judicial activism. 
A review of the debates that occurred in the Alberta legislature helps to provide a more full account 
of the reaction given by the Alberta government.  The legislature provides the opportunity for debate 
about various topics and was the arena in which the opposition MLA’s first had the opportunity to 
question Premier Klein on his ringing endorsement of the Supreme Court’s decision.  The verdict was 
one of the first topics debated upon the legislature’s return, with Klein being questioned as to why the 
Alberta government would be encouraging citizens to purchase private insurance that they may not be 
eligible for due to physical ailments.  Klein argued that the only thing the Alberta government had 
                                                
58 Markusoff, Jason.  “Alberta Government very pleased with this decision” Edmonton 
Journal (10 June 2005) A3 at A3
59 Ibid
60 Civil Marriage Act.  Department of Justice Canada 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31376.html (Accessed on 1 November 2006)
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adopted was “policy to pursue the investigation into making our system consistent with the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruling.  Now, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the case of a Québec patient that 
that person was entitled to alleviate his pain and his suffering if he wanted to buy private insurance or 
pay for it out of his own pocket.”61  The first session was just the beginning of Alberta defending the 
Court’s decision in the legislature.  
British Columbia: The first response provided by the provincial government of British Columbia 
was to act as an intervener in the case.  BC was joined by Ontario and Saskatchewan in an effort to 
show support for Québec’s position, defending Québec’s law and their legislative authority, against 
the Court’s interference.  The BC Attorney General (AG) noted that the decision should be a 
legislative and not a legal matter, “determining the mix between public involvement and private 
involvement in the health care system is a matter uniquely for the Legislature and the executive 
government to decide.”62  The BC AG goes on to point out that if the decision were to come under the 
purview of the Court, “the concept of constitutionality protected by liberty does not include a right to 
enter into contracts or practice a profession”, and therefore the individual has not been deprived of his 
s.7 Charter rights.63 In both Factums, the governments of BC and Ontario affirm their belief that the 
Court should not have interfered in an area of provincial jurisdiction, pointing out that the matter is 
better left up to the legislature rather than the court system, and that Québec is within its right to 
implement an explicit ban on private insurance for publicly-insured services.  Publicly stated 
opposition to the decision followed this act as an intervener.
                                                
61 Alberta Legislature.  Alberta Hansard.  15 November 2005.  Pg. 4
62 BC Intervener Factum, pg. 12
63 Ibid pg. 14
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In his immediate public response to the ruling, Premier Gordon Campbell voiced his displeasure 
for the ruling stating, "I don't think we want two-tier health care, one tier for Québec and another tier 
for the rest of the country."64 Further, Health Minister Abbot pointed out that focus should remain on 
the public health care system, “We really need to focus in our ministry on the public health care 
system.  That is the key part of our mandate.  British Columbia has a world-class health care system 
but there is always room for improvement in every system, even a $12.5-billion system.”65  
Therefore, the government acted as an intervener in the case and made clear statements exhibiting its 
displeasure with the Court’s decision, thus demonstrating a negative reaction to the verdict handed 
down.  
Manitoba: The NDP provincial government’s response to the ruling is in line with the province’s 
history, as Manitoba has had an explicit ban on private insurance longer than any other western 
province, a history that dates back to the 1950’s.66  In Doer’s immediate response to the Chaoulli
decision, he stated that the Supreme Court’s decision did not mark the end of Canadian medicare.  
Instead, he viewed it as an “alarm bell’ concerning the importance of reducing waiting lists, 
especially for elective procedures such as hip and knee replacements.67   Further to Doer’s comments, 
Manitoba’s Minister of Health Tim Sale demonstrated the concern the decision raises, “we may need 
to change how we protect medicare but there was determination from the two [Provincial Health 
Ministers] that I spoke with, and I’ve certainly heard the same from Saskatchewan, we want to defend 
                                                
64 Bueckert, Dennis.  “Top Court OK’s Two-Tier Care.  Door Open to Private, Parallel 
Health System.” The Province (10 June 2005) A15
65 Bailey, Ian. “New Health Minister “Jazzed” at Task Facing Him.” The Province (17 June 
2005) A3
66 Marchildon, Greg.  “Private Insurance for Medicare: Policy History and Trajectory in the 
Four Western Provinces”.  Access to Care, Access to Justice. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press.  2005.  Pg. 248
67 Cotter, John.  “Provinces Respond to Ruling”. The Province (9 June 2005)
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a universal health care system”.68  However, Premier Doer expected a similar challenge to be brought 
in Manitoba, as Manitoba has the same type of anti-private insurance law as Québec.69
With this problem in mind, Doer pointed to the fact that Manitoba already uses private care; 
Manitoba paid for patients to go to Thunder Bay and North Dakota for radiation treatments in 1999
when waiting lists in Manitoba were more than eight weeks.70  That policy, plus improving 
Manitoba's facilities, means all patients can now be treated in Winnipeg after waiting less than a 
week.  This fact is important to keep in mind, as Justices McLachlin and Major point out in their 
decision that a ban on private health insurance “might be constitutional in circumstances where health 
care services are reasonable as to both quality and timeliness.”71  The Manitoba government’s 
negative reaction to the decision was not limited to comments made in the media.  
To further supplement the statements in the media, Sale reinforced the public reaction of the 
Manitoba government in the legislature.  In his first opportunity to speak on the topic in the 
legislature after the Court’s decision, Sale was quick to echo Premier Doer’s statements regarding 
previously using private health, by stating that, 
We do contract with private facilities. We contract with Western 
Surgical Centre for eye cataract surgery, for example, among other 
procedures. We do not have an ideological block against working 
with the private sector in order to perform volumes of service that we 
wish to purchase. It has been done for years under numbers of 
                                                
68 Bueckert, Dennis. “Provinces to discuss how to respond after high court health care ruling” 
The Province (10 June 2005) C-Health News 
http://chealth.canoe.ca/health_news_details.asp?news_id=14804&news_channel_id=0. 
(Accessed 24 August 2006) 
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government. We are not ideologically bound.  What we believe in is 
medicare.72
Thus, the Manitoba government’s comments in the media and the legislature have clearly 
been in opposition to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
Newfoundland and Labrador:  Newfoundland and Labrador is a province in which the Supreme 
Court’s decision did not initiate a great debate about the possibility of introducing private financing 
for publicly-insured services.  Health Minister John Ottenheimer’s immediate response to the 
Supreme Court decision demonstrated no real level of concern for any impact on the province.  In his 
initial response, Ottenheimer pointed out that the decision must be kept in the context of the 
jurisdiction stating, “"It's important to recognize and remember that yesterday's decision out of the 
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with Québec law, a Québec plaintiff and the Québec Charter of 
Rights.”73  Further, Ottenheimer pointed out that the outcome of the case might benefit Newfoundland 
and Labrador and the public system, as “"This (decision) gives us the opportunity to recommit to 
public health care and to strengthen (it) in our province. That's what this decision has done for us and, 
certainly, for me as the minister in this area.”74 Ottenheimer continued to be the point man for the 
government of Newfoundland and Labrador on the decision.   
Further demonstrating commitment by the Newfoundland and Labrador government, Ottenheimer 
continued by pointing out that “this government is firmly entrenched in its belief that what is in the 
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best interest of Newfoundland and Labradoreans is a well-funded and well-respected public health-
care system.”75  
New Brunswick:  As in Newfoundland and Labrador, the decision handed down by the Court did 
not initiate a great debate within the province of New Brunswick.  Premier Bernard Lord initially 
stated that his government was not sure what the implications of the decision would be in New 
Brunswick, beyond greater debate about wait times and private health care.  Following this, Lord 
showed his commitment to the public system, 
We certainly want to maintain in New Brunswick a public-funded 
health-care system that is accessible to all and of high quality.  At the 
same time I don’t think we can close our eyes to the fact that there is 
private sector involvement in health care now already throughout this 
country.  I think it’s going to open up a new debate on health care in 
this country.76  
However, Lord’s commitment to medicare may have appeared stronger in his initial reaction than 
comments delivered later that month at the Council of Atlantic Premier’s meeting.  
At the Council of Atlantic Premier’s meeting, Premier Lord revealed that his government perceived 
a greater role for the private sector in the delivery of health care in New Brunswick.  Lord pointed out 
that private insurers are involved in health care and that the debate on private health care should be 
based on “what role the private sector plays, not whether there is a role.”77  Lord’s comment exhibited 
that his government had been clearly pushing for an open debate on exploring the potential role that 
the private sector could play in improving the health care system.  Although pushing to open up the 
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debate on the role the private sector should play in healthcare, the government of New Brunswick’s 
reaction appears to be best classed as neutral, due to their initial show of support for medicare, 
followed by Lord’s comments at the Council of Atlantic Premier’s meeting.  The government of New 
Brunswick did not clearly exhibit either a positive or a negative reaction to the decision.
Nova Scotia:  Following the trend set by Newfoundland and Labrador and New Brunswick, the 
decision in the Chaoulli case provided for only slightly higher levels of debate in the province of 
Nova Scotia.  The initial reaction of Premier Hamm was to express that he did not anticipate the 
decision to have an immediate or drastic impact on the health care system.78  Hamm noted that even 
without the introduction of private financing of publicly-insured services, “all of us are struggling…
There's a lot of discussion as to whether in 10 years we'll be able to look after all the seniors that we 
will have in our provinces.  There has to be a move towards a system that realistically will meet the 
needs of the future. The need is there. The ability to meet the need is in question."79  
Ontario:  The government of Ontario had a ban on private insurance for publicly-insured services 
and during the Ontario government’s intervention in the case, insisted that the matter is legislative 
and not judicial.  Similarly to the Factum provided by the BC Attorney General, the Factum provided 
by the Attorney General of Ontario concludes that the issue at bar is not a legal matter, but rather a 
legislative one.  In the Factum, the Ontario AG concludes that:  
An ideal model of health care is not a principle of fundamental 
justice because it is not a legal principle; it is a quintessential policy 
issue on which there is no consensus except on the highest level of 
abstraction.  As such, it is too imprecise to provide any measure of 
guidance to the judicial system in assessing the competing claims in 
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the health care system.  Consequently, even if there were a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or security of the person, it has not been 
shown that such deprivation is not in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.80    
In the Ontario Factum, the government affirms their belief that the Court should not have interfered in 
an area of provincial jurisdiction, pointing out that the matter is better left up to the legislature rather 
than the court system and that Québec is within its right to implement an explicit ban on private 
insurance for publicly-insured services.  
Since taking over as Premier, Dalton McGuinty has been a staunch supporter of a single-payer 
system, and has moved to implement measures to protect the current system of delivery in Ontario 
from private insurance interests.  This commitment to a single-payer system was demonstrated by 
Health Minister Smitherman after the Chaoulli decision was handed down, when he stated that “Our 
government firmly believes In a single-payer, universally accessible health-care system, where the 
breadth of your wallet is not a determinant in whether you're getting more timely or higher quality 
access to health-care services."81  In line with comments made by Smitherman, Premier McGuinty 
spoke out and further demonstrated the provincial government’s desire to prevent private insurance 
from infiltrating Ontario, “We understand that Ontarians are concerned about wait times, but I want 
them to know they have a government in place that is attacking this in a very aggressive way.”82  The 
Ontario government continued to demonstrate that they do not agree with the decision in the 
legislature.  
Debates within the legislature offered another avenue for the Ontario government to display their 
negative reaction to the decision made by the Supreme Court and cement their position as a supporter 
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of a universal health care system.  The day the decision was handed down, McGuinty took the 
opportunity in the legislature to re-affirm Ontario’s position.  Upon being asked if he could reassure 
Ontarians that universal, one-tiered, accessible and publicly administered health care would remain 
protected in Ontario, McGuinty responded,
Ontario’s position on medicare is very clear and, in fact, it is now 
embodied in Ontario law, our Commitment to the Future of Medicare 
Act.  This law protects universal, public medicare. It ensures that all 
Ontarians have access to quality care, regardless of their ability to 
pay. Medicare, in combination with our law, the Commitment to the 
Future of Medicare Act, gives expression to what I think is a 
universal desire on the part of Ontarians to ensure that we are giving 
good, quality health care to all Ontarians, regardless of their ability 
to pay83
Premier McGuinty further went on to acknowledge that the main factor in the Court’s decision had to 
do with wait times and assured Ontarians that his government would be attacking this problem 
aggressively.  Therefore, after examining comments made in both the media and the legislature, it 
is clear that the government of Ontario was vocal in its displeasure with the Court’s decision.  
PEI:  In the PEI government’s first response to the Court’s decision regarding the possible 
introduction of private financing for publicly-insured services, Premier Binns held that he did not see 
any room for private payments in PEI’s system.84  The PEI government is against allowing private 
funding to infiltrate the public system, however, not all the criticism the PEI government shelled out 
regarding the decision was directed at the Court, but also addressed what the government saw as the 
original cause of the problem, a cut in federal funding to the provincial governments.  This fact is 
highlighted when Premier Binns opined that the federal government’s lack of funding has pushed the 
provinces to explore other avenues in order to make the system efficient.  In regards to federal 
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funding, Premier Binns said “I'm going to be calling on the federal government to bring funding back 
to where it used to be. There was an increase in funds but that just brought us back to where we were 
in 2000, counting for inflation. Health transfers have been in decline basically since the mid 1990s,”85
thus representing a negative reaction demonstrated by the government of PEI.  Therefore, the PEI 
government reacted negatively to the decision, but utilized the opportunity to also show displeasure 
with the cuts made by the federal government, hinting that this may be the cause for the long waiting 
lists.
Québec:  Naturally, since the case dealt with a law the Québec provincial government had 
implemented as part of their provincial health care scheme, the government reacted negatively to 
what they viewed as interference by the Court in an area under their sanction.  The Québec 
government opposed the challenge, and as pointed out in Chapter 2, was successful twice in lower 
courts before Dr. Chaoulli’s appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada.  Based on the fact that the 
Québec government acted as a defendant in three court cases against Dr. Chaoulli, it is clear that the 
Québec government does not agree with the decision handed down by the Supreme Court.  
The government’s immediate response showed its disgruntlement with the decision when Premier 
Charest declared that his government is “going to do what we have to do to preserve the health-care 
system in which we believe”86, demonstrating Québec’s belief in the single-payer model of health 
care in Canada.  However, this is only where the response began, as soon the Charest government’s 
negative reaction extended to discussions of implementing the Notwithstanding Clause in response to 
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the Chaoulli decision.87  Mere consideration of such a move demonstrates the degree to which the 
Québec government was dissatisfied with the decision, and the level of importance this issue holds 
with the Québec government.  Aside from the blanket use of the Notwithstanding Clause in Québec in 
protest to the adoption of the Canadian Charter, the Notwithstanding Clause has only been invoked 
once in Saskatchewan due to the level of potential political fallout that it carries.  Thus, due to the 
immediate response of the Québec government and discussions invoking the Notwithstanding Clause 
in response to the decision, the Québec government clearly responded in a negative fashion to the 
decision.  
Saskatchewan: The government of Saskatchewan acted as an intervener in the case although it did 
not implement a similar ban. When examining the Factum the Saskatchewan Attorney General (AG) 
provided the Court, it is clear that the position the Saskatchewan government takes is that the Charter
allows considerable latitude for governments to make significant and highly complicated social policy 
decisions, and that laws such as this, should be under legislative purview.  As well, the Factum 
demonstrates that the Saskatchewan government feels that the issues are very narrow and that “a 
general free-standing right to publicly funded health care is not at issue” and that “the Québec laws 
impugned in this appeal fall within exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction” as well as not 
engaging s. 7.88  The goal of achieving a universal publicly funded health care system is at the centre 
of Saskatchewan’s health care legislative history, and it is clear the government does not agree with 
the interference of the Court in regards to Québec’s law. 
When the intervening provinces and Québec were unsuccessful in their defense of the Québec law, 
the Saskatchewan government delivered its reaction in the media.  Premier Lorne Calvert has been 
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one of the most vocal opponents of the decision from the moment it was rendered, stating that he was 
very ‘disturbed’ about the possibility of the Chaoulli decision “opening the door to an Americanized 
health-care system in Canada.”89  Following this, Calvert speculated on the ‘legislative tools’ that 
might be available at both levels of government to ‘strengthen’ the universal, single-payer system.90  
However, Calvert also pondered aloud “how a decision based on the Québec charter and affects a 
Québec issue, what implications that will have for Saskatchewan, and (the) provinces generally, these 
at this moment are in some ways unclear to me”, demonstrating that Saskatchewan, although clearly 
opposing the decision, had not yet figured out a legislative response to the decision.  
The government of Saskatchewan continued to react negatively to the decision.  Premier Calvert 
was very specific in pointing out “if there are measures that we will need to take to preserve the 
system, I want to look at every opportunity,”91 demonstrating that the government did not want to 
consider allowing any further opening of private insurance to the public health care system under any 
circumstances.  Considering the list of the statements made in the media by the government of 
Saskatchewan, it is clear that, although not containing any explicit ban on private insurance, the 
government of Saskatchewan reacted negatively to the decision.
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5.1 E-Mail Administered Questionnaires
Following the public reactions, an e-mail administered questionnaire was sent out to each province.  
In the cases of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, both provincial governments answered 
the questions asked via the e-mail administered questionnaire regarding their reactions to the 
decision, while the province of Alberta responded only to the e-mail, not the questionnaire attached.92  
E-mail was chosen as the method of interviewing due to the advantage of being able to rapidly 
survey, an attribute well documented in previous research.93  E-mail surveys can be done faster than 
telephone surveys and are inexpensive since they eliminate postage, printing, and/or interviewer 
costs.94  For the e-mail interview, a set of default questions was constructed for each provincial 
government, with minor changes made for specific provinces where appropriate.  The questionnaires 
were sent to the Premiers and Health Ministers of each province on 17 June 2006, with follow up 
emails sent to provinces that did not provide a response on 4 July 2006.  Research demonstrated it be 
a strategic initiative to include a letter outlining the project with the questionnaires, as this has been 
demonstrated to help elicit responses from elites.95  Aside from the three provinces that responded to 
the e-mail, and the provinces that did not respond to either the first or follow-up email, “gatekeepers” 
provided responses on behalf of their government, indicating that either the government was too busy 
or the issue was too sensitive to comment on.    
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Gatekeepers are individuals who guard the door to the elite, protecting them from the hassle of 
having to respond or interact with every individual that would like a moment of their time.  The 
researcher should anticipate gatekeepers when attempting to conduct interviews with elites and have a 
strategy to circumvent them prepared.96  The suggested step to overcome gatekeepers is to travel to 
the elite’s office,97 however, elites in this study were located all across Canada, thus removing any 
possibility of travelling to their office.  Due to the work of gate-keepers, the response rate to the 
questionnaires was low.  In the Case of Alberta, Health and Wellness Minister Iris Evans responded 
to the initial e-mail, but did not address any of the questions in the questionnaire, instead focusing on 
reiterating the message of the government of Alberta’s strategy for the Third-Way.  
In the case of Newfoundland and Labrador, Karen Stone, Legislative Consultant for the 
Department of Health and Community Services stated simply that the government did not feel that the 
Supreme Court overstepped its boundaries in striking down a law approved by a provincial 
legislature.98  In the response provided by the province of Nova Scotia, Jim Houston, Director of 
Intergovernmental Affairs, Nova Scotia Department of Health, when faced with the exact same 
question, merely stated, “The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the nation. Its 
decisions are final and binding.”99  Thus, although these provincial governments did not react 
negatively to the decision as predicted, they did not react positively either.  However, there is no 
concrete explanation for why these provincial governments reacted in the manner they did.  There is 
the possibility that provincial governments have come to accept that laws may be challenged in the 
Supreme Court, and that a ruling striking down legislation, if provided, cannot be challenged and is 
simply a matter of governing in modern Canada.






Now that each provincial government has provided their reactions, each reaction must be analyzed 




This chapter compares the reactions of the provinces with the predicted reactions generated by the 
four hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4.  Following this, the chapter combines these four hypotheses 
into a set of multi-stage hypotheses in order to test their combined predictive capacity. 
Hypothesis #1:  
The first hypothesis predicted that all provincial governments would react negatively to the 
decision because elected provincial governments would tend to disagree in principle with the Court 
making decisions on matters that legislators see as their own prerogative.  The scores this hypothesis 
received are displayed in tables 11 and 12 below, in both dichotomous and relative scores 
respectively.100  As noted earlier, a dichotomous score is used in order to provide an opportunity to 
have all of the original four hypotheses’ scores comparable, as hypothesis #2 folds the dependant 
variable into two categories rather than three.  However, a relative scale will also be used to measure 
the accuracy of the other variables in predicting provincial reactions to the decision.  An analysis of 
each hypothesis will be made with a score provided to each.  The scores are then compared, and a 
determination of the most accurate hypothesis made.
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Negative X X X X X X
Positive/Neutral X X X X
Hypothesis #1 scores an 8.
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Hypothesis #1 scores 5.
The government of Alberta contravened the hypothesis because the decision could aid in justifying 
any potential expansion of the private sector in health care.  Alberta, like all other provincial 
governments, was predicted to react negatively to the decision because an outside entity was 
interfering in its jurisdiction.  However, the decision came at an opportune time for the government of 
Alberta as it was introducing reforms to public health care in Alberta.  Such a decision gave the 
government judicial affirmation from the highest court in the country and thus led to a positive 
reaction to the decision.  This demonstrates that ideology was more of a concern to the province of 
Alberta than the interference of an outside entity, even though Alberta had demonstrated its 
opposition to such interference during the gay marriage debate.    In a similar vein, three of the 
Atlantic provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia all reacted 
neutrally to the decision.  The decision did not have any potential effect on the manner in which any 
of these provinces implemented their health care plans, thus leading them to react neither negatively 
nor positively. 
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Although not the weakest performer in terms of overall score, hypothesis #1 is the weakest 
hypothesis by design.  Simply determining that governments will all react negatively to an outside 
entity interfering in an area of provincial jurisdiction is a far too simplistic approach.  Although such 
an expectation was generated through recent literature, the weakness of the hypothesis, the fact that it 
cannot explain variation, makes the hypothesis not suitable for determining governmental behaviour.  
In addition, even if scoring perfect, this hypothesis would only be applicable to situations in which 
governments have to make policy decisions when an outside entity interferes in their jurisdiction.  
Thus, the inability of the hypothesis to explain variation removes it from consideration for the most 
accurate predictor of governmental behaviour.
Hypothesis #2:
The second hypothesis predicted that the further a provincial government moved along the 
restriction scale the more vigorously a province would oppose the decision, while provinces not 
moving across the scale, regardless of whether they implement a ban or not, would react in a neutral 
or positive manner.  The results of the hypothesis received are listed in Table 13 below.  























High X X X X
Medium
Low X X X X X X
Actual Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X
Positive/Neutral X X X X
Hypothesis #2 scores 8.
It was expected that all provincial governments moving any distance across the restriction scale 
would react negatively to the decision but Alberta once again contravened the hypothesis and reacted 
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in a positive manner. Alberta’s positive response may have been anticipated by some due to the 
Alberta government’s proposal to institute its “Third-Way” health care reform package.  Although the 
government of Alberta has been one of the most critical provinces towards outside interference in the 
province’s affairs, the Court’s decision comes at an opportune moment and provides judicial 
affirmation from the top court in the country.  
Of the provinces predicted to react in a neutral or positive manner, Ontario, PEI and Saskatchewan 
all contravened the hypothesis and responded negatively. According to the restriction scale, although 
Ontario and PEI both implement laws banning private insurance for publicly-insured services, they 
both also implement laws that would prevent an increase in the role private insurance plays within the 
province if those bans were to be struck down.  These laws would prevent either province from 
moving along the restriction scale, leading the second hypothesis to predict that neither would react 
negatively to the decision.  However, both provinces did react negatively to the decision, thus 
contravening the hypothesis.  Of the three provinces, Saskatchewan is the only one that does not 
implement a ban similar to the one under challenge in the Chaoulli case.  Still, the government of 
Saskatchewan was one of the most vociferous opponents of the decision, going as far as to intervene 
on behalf of the government of Québec.  
Of the three remaining provinces predicted to react either neutrally or positively, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia all reacted in the predicted manner.  Still, although 
not raising the score for the hypothesis, the inability of the hypothesis to predict whether these 
provinces would react neutrally or positively leaves the accuracy of the second hypothesis to predict 
provincial reactions on its own in question.
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Hypothesis #3:  
The third hypothesis to be tested is that provincial governments that are more 
ideologically predisposed to the privatization of health care will welcome the decision made 
by the Supreme Court.  Following the prediction of the third hypothesis, it was expected that 
all three provincial governments considered to be ideologically predisposed to privatization, 
Alberta, BC, and Québec would welcome the decision. The verdict handed down in the 
Chaoulli case, if embraced, provides each provincial government with the opportunity to 
legitimize their practice of allowing private clinics to operate within their provincial 
boundaries.  The score for hypothesis #3 can be seen below in tables 14 and 15.
Table 14: Hypothesis #3 Score (Dichotomous Scale)
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Hypothesis #3 scores a 10
Table 15: Hypothesis #3 Score (Relative Scale)
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British Columbia and Québec, both predicted by the third hypothesis to respond positively to the 
decision contravened the hypothesis by reacting negatively.  The governments of British Columbia 
and Québec both passed on a chance to legitimize the operation of private clinics in their province, 
connoting that each government based its decision on a factor other than their ideological disposition.   
Also, the third hypothesis also predicted Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova 
Scotia to react negatively to the decision, however, all three reacted neutrally to the decision, thus, 
hypothesis three is not a very accurate predictor of provincial reactions to the decision.
Finally, all non-ideologically predisposed provincial governments, Manitoba, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, PEI, and Saskatchewan reacted in the predicted, 
negative or neutral manner.
Hypothesis #4:
The fourth hypothesis to be tested is based on the idea that provincial reaction will be driven by 
public opinion, and has a subset of three hypotheses.  The first of the subset, hypothesis #4a, predicts 
that the provinces that are most likely to oppose the decision are those where public opinion is least 
supportive of the decision.  Following this prediction, it is expected that, relative to the other 
provinces, there is a high chance that the Atlantic provinces, Manitoba and Saskatchewan will oppose 
the decision; a medium chance that both Alberta and Ontario will oppose the decision; and there is a 
low chance that British Columbia or Québec will oppose the decision.  The results for hypothesis #4a 
are shown below in tables 16 and 17.
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Table 16: Hypothesis #4a Score (Dichotomous Scale)
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Hypothesis #4a scores a 9
Of the provinces with a high chance of opposing the decision, only three, Manitoba, Saskatchewan 
and PEI, reacted in the predicted manner.  The remaining Atlantic provinces, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia all contravened the prediction and reacted neutrally.  The 
provinces given a medium chance to oppose the decision were split, as Ontario reacted negatively to 
the decision, while Alberta contravened yet another hypothesis by reacting positively to the decision.  
Finally, of the provinces predicted to have a low probability of opposing the decision, both British
Columbia and Québec contravened the hypothesis and reacted in a negative manner.  Thus, 
hypothesis #4a was not a very accurate predictor of provincial reactions to the decision.
The second hypothesis in the subset, hypothesis #4b, predicted that Ontario would have the highest 
probability of opposing the decision and that Alberta would have the lowest probability of opposing 
73
the decision.  When public opinion is viewed relative to both Ontario and Alberta, it appears that the 
remaining eight provinces would have a medium probability of opposing the decision.  The results for 
the hypothesis are displayed in tables 18 and 19.
Table 18: Hypothesis #4b Score (Dichotomous Scale)
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Hypothesis #4b scores 5
Hypothesis #4b was correct in predicting the government of Ontario’s negative reaction as well as 
that of the government of Alberta, which was predicted to react the most positively of any of the 
provinces. The scoring between the two scales varies greatly for this hypothesis, as the two scales 
correctly predict different reactions.  Since focus is placed on the relative scale score, the hypothesis 
scores very well.  However, the score for hypothesis #4b is misleading, as the hypothesis is based on 
strong public opinion, rather than just public opinion.  In this case, the only two provinces displaying 
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any real preference were Ontario and Alberta, while the hypothesis’ predictions for the other 
provinces is a safe one.  
By predicting all of the other provinces to react neutrally, the hypothesis protects itself against 
making any real claims in which it could potentially receive the highest wrong score.  Therefore, in 
the current case, the hypothesis has the opportunity to get two wrong for the price of one, while also 
having the opportunity to score correctly with neutral predictions, which it does in three cases.  Thus, 
although receiving a low score and appearing to be a strong predictor of governmental reactions to the 
decision, the hypothesis is relatively weak, as it does not take the chance to make correct predictions, 
and would not, in general, be a good predictor of governmental behaviour.
Finally, the third hypothesis in the subset, hypothesis #4c, predicts that provinces are reacting to 
provincial public opinion in regards to allowing third-party insurance where services are not offered 
in a timely manner.  The focus of hypothesis #4c is slightly different from the other two in the subset, 
as it focuses on the actual design of healthcare rather than agreement or disagreement with the 
decision.  Hypothesis #4c predicted that Québec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan would have had the 
lowest probability of opposing the decision; Ontario was predicted to have a medium chance of 
opposing the decision; while the Atlantic provinces, Alberta, and British Columbia were seen to have 
the highest probability of opposing the decision.  The results for the hypothesis are found in tables 20 
and 21.
Table 20: Hypothesis #4c Score (Dichotomous Scale)
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Medium X
Low X X X
Actual 
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Hypothesis #4c scores 12
Of the six provinces predicted to react negatively, only British Columbia and PEI reacted in the 
predicted manner, while none of the provinces predicted to react in a positive manner did so.  
Considering that hypothesis #4c only correctly predicted two reactions to the decision, missing four 
provinces by one column and another four by two columns (based on the relative scale), it cannot be 
considered a very accurate predictor of provincial reaction to the decision.  
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6.1 Multi-Stage Hypotheses
The weakness in the design of the second hypothesis is that the hypothesis cannot 
differentiate between positive and neutral reactions and combining one of the remaining 
hypotheses in order to aid in predicting whether a province will react positively or neutrally 
could increase the overall predictive capacity of a hypothesis.  Thus, the second hypothesis 
has been combined with hypothesis #3 and #4, first with the second hypothesis acting as the 
first stage before application of the third and fourth hypotheses in the first four multi-stage 
hypotheses, followed by the second hypothesis performing as the second stage in the 
remaining four.  All multi-stage hypotheses are graded solely on the relative scale.
Multi-Stage1 (hypothesis #2 + #3)
Multi-stage1 begins its test by first applying the second hypothesis to determine how accurate this 
stage is at predicting negative reactions.  In the second stage, the third hypothesis is applied to those 
provinces that the second hypothesis has predicted will react either neutrally or positively, in order to 
determine if the third hypothesis can correctly predict whether these provinces will react either 
neutrally or positively.  The results for Multi-Stage1 are displayed below in a Table 22 (two-parts).























High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
Actual Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
77
Negative X X X X X X













Neutral X X X
Positive
Multi-Stage1 scores 11
When the second hypothesis is applied during the first stage, Alberta, Ontario, PEI and Saskatchewan 
are predicted incorrectly.  The second hypothesis correctly predicts three provinces, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia to react either neutrally or positively, leaving these 
three provinces to be tested by the third hypothesis during the second stage.  
The second stage of the hypothesis does not correctly predict the reactions of the Newfoundland 
and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia as the third hypothesis predicted that these provinces 
would react in a negative manner, however, all three provided a neutral reaction to the decision.  
Thus, the final score for Multi-stage1 is 11. 
Multi-Stage2 (hypothesis #2 + #4a)
Multi-Stage2 begins by applying the second hypothesis during the first stage, followed by the 
application of hypothesis #4a to those provinces predicted to react either neutrally or positively by the 
second hypothesis.  Hypothesis #4a predicts that provinces that are most likely to oppose the decision 
are those in which public opinion is least supportive relative to the other provinces.  The results for 
Multi-Stage2 are listed below in Table 23.
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High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
Actual Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X













Neutral X X X
Positive
Multi-Stage2 scores an 11
The results for Multi-Stage2 are identical to those of Multi-Stage1.  During the first stage, Alberta, 
Ontario, PEI, and Saskatchewan are predicted incorrectly, while in the second stage, hypothesis #4a 
incorrectly predicts the responses of the three provinces that the second hypothesis could not 
differentiate between, predicting negative responses where neutral ones were provided.  Thus, Multi-
Stage2 also scores an 11.
Multi-Stage3 (hypothesis #2 + #4b)
Similar to the previous multi-stage hypotheses, the second hypothesis is applied during the first 
stage of testing and is then followed by the application of hypothesis #4b during the second stage, 
which bases its predictions on strong public opinion.  The results for Multi-Stage3 are presented 
below in Table 24.
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High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
Actual Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X













Neutral X X X
Positive
Multi-Stage3 scores a 8   
Following the application of the second hypothesis, and the four incorrect predictions made, 
hypothesis #4b improves upon the success found in the two previous multi-stage hypotheses.  The 
three provinces the second hypothesis has difficulty differentiating predictions for, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, are all correctly predicted to react neutrally by 
hypothesis #4b.  This correct application during the second stage of the hypothesis leads to a score of 
8 for Multi-Stage3.
Multi-Stage4 (hypothesis #2 + #4c)
Multi-Stage4 is the last of the multi-stage hypotheses to apply the second hypothesis during 
the first stage of testing.  The second stage of testing will see the application of hypothesis #4c, which 
predicts that provinces are reacting to provincial public opinion in regards to allowing third party 
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insurance where services are not offered in a timely manner.  The results for Multi-Stage4 are 
displayed below in Table 25.























High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
Actual Reaction Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X













Neutral X X X
Positive
Multi-Stage4 scores a 11.
Although the results for Multi-Stage4 are the same as those of both Multi-Stage1 & Multi-stage2, 
they are the same for different reasons.  As in three preceding multi-stage hypotheses, the first stage 
of the process yielded a score of 8, as Alberta, Ontario, PEI and Saskatchewan were predicted 
incorrectly by the second hypothesis.  During the second stage, Multi-Stage4 gained another 3 points 
for its overall score.  However, rather than predicting Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, 
and Nova Scotia to react negatively, the second stage predicted these provinces to react positively to 
the decision.  Yet, a neutral response from the three provincial governments left Multi-Stage4 with 
the same score as Multi-Stage1 and Multi-Stage2, 11.
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Multi-Stage5 (hypothesis #3 + #2)
Multi-Stage5 is the first of the multi-stage hypothesis to apply the second hypothesis in the second 
stage rather than the first.  In this instance, hypothesis #3 will first be applied, receiving a score based 
on how accurately it predicts the positive and neutral responses of the ten provincial governments.  
Following this, the provinces the first stage predicts to have negative responses will be tested by the 
second hypothesis.  The results of Multi-Stage5 are presented below in Table 26.
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Alb. BC Man. Nfld. NB NS Ont. PEI Que. Sask.
Negative X X X X X X












Low X X X
Actual 
Reaction
Negative X X X X
Positive/ 
Neutral
Multi-Stage5 scores a 13
The first stage of Multi-Stage5 produces five errant predictions, as BC and Québec are completely 
wrong, while Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia are wrong by one 
column.  The second stage finds three more predictions that are incorrect.  Ontario, PEI, and 
Saskatchewan are predicted to have a positive or neutral reaction, yet the government reacted 
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negatively to the decision.  The combined incorrect predictions have lead to a score of 13 for Multi-
Stage5.
Multi-Stage6 (hypothesis #4a + #2)
Multi-Stage6 applies hypothesis #4a during the first stage and the second hypothesis during the 
second stage.  Those provinces that are predicted to react negatively during the first stage are tested 
by the second hypothesis during the second stage, with the total score from the first and second stages 
producing an overall score for Multi-Stage6.  The results are displayed in Table 27.
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The first stage of the hypothesis proves to be very inaccurate in its predictions, scoring only three 
correct predictions, Manitoba, PEI, and Saskatchewan, while the remaining seven provinces are 
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incorrect by at least one category.  The second stage continues the poor accuracy level, incorrectly 
predicting both PEI and Saskatchewan.  Therefore, the final score for Multi-Stage6 is 15.
Multi-Stage7 (hypothesis #4b + #2)
The first stage of Multi-Stage7 applies hypothesis #4b, which focuses on strong public 
opinion regarding the decision, and then applies the second hypothesis during the second stage, which 
focuses on testing the negative reactions predicted during the first stage.  The results are listed in 
Table 28.
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Multi-stage7 scores 7.       
The first stage of the hypothesis correctly predicts only five provincial reactions, however, still 
manages to gain a low score.  The first stage predicted that Ontario would be the only provincial 
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government to respond negatively to the decision, but incorrectly predicts the Ontario reaction during 
the second stage.  Thus, the score for the hypothesis is low, considering its lack of accuracy in 
correctly predicting government reactions.  The reason for such a low score can be attributed to the 
fact that aside from Ontario and Alberta, the first stage of the hypothesis predicts all provincial 
government reactions to be neutral.  Such a tactic results in a low score, as the most points the 
hypothesis can gain due to an incorrect score in most instances is one, while the odds would suggest 
that a few provincial governments should respond in the manner predicted.  Thus, although not 
correctly predicting many provincial reactions, the hypothesis still receives a low score of 7.
Multi-Stage8 (hypothesis #4c + #2)
Finally, Multi-Stage8 is the last of the hypothesis to be tested.  The hypothesis first tests how 
correctly hypothesis #4c can predict positive and neutral reactions, and then applies the second 
hypothesis to those provinces that the first stage predicts to react negatively.  The results for Multi-
Stage8 are shown in table 29.























High X X X
Medium X
Low X X X X X X
Actual 
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Negative X X X X X X














Negative X X X
Positive/ 
Neutral
Multi-stage8 scores 10  
Multi-Stage8 begins poorly, by only making four correct predictions during the first stage, although 
only two predictions were incorrect by two columns.  The situation does improve slightly during the 
second stage.  The second stage does correctly predict the reactions of both Manitoba and Québec, 
but does add another incorrect prediction to the hypothesis, as Saskatchewan, predicted to have a 
positive or neutral reaction to the decision, reacted negatively to the decision.  The incorrect 
prediction for the province of Saskatchewan raised the score of the hypothesis to 10.   
   
6.2 Which Hypothesis Performed Best?
Following the testing of each hypothesis, the scores can be calculated and compared; making it 
possible to determine which hypothesis is the most accurate predictor of provincial reactions to the 
Chaoulli decision.  In order to clearly compare the results, Table 30 lists how many correct 
predictions each hypothesis made when positive and neutral were folded together into one option; the 
score each hypothesis received on the dichotomous scale; how many correct predictions were made 
by each hypothesis when positive and neutral were not folded together; the dichotomous score for 
each hypothesis; the score each hypothesis would receive based on the amount of correct/incorrect 
predictions made; and finally, the relative score for each hypothesis.  
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Table 30: Overview of Hypothesis Scores
















1 6/4 8 6/4 8 5
2 6/4 8 8
3 5/5 10 5/5 10 7
4a 4/6 12 3/7 14 9
4b 6/4 8 5/5 10 6

























Of the hypotheses scored on the dichotomous scale, hypothesis #2 and #4b correctly predicted the 
most provincial reactions with six101.  This led both to receive a score of 8, slightly better than 
hypothesis #3, which received a 10 for five correct predictions.  As previously mentioned, the 
dichotomous scale was used in order to allow for comparable results, as hypothesis #2 could not 
differentiate between positive and neutral reactions, thus forcing a folding of the dependent variable 
from three categories into two.  However, scoring the remaining hypotheses on a relative scale allows 
for more accurate scores, as some hypotheses may gain credit for predictions due to the folded 
                                                
101 Hypothesis #1 also tied for the best score but due to its inability to explain variation is not 
considered as one of the most accurate predictors.
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dependant variable, while other hypotheses may gain added points for wrong predictions by scoring a 
2, while they may have only scored a 1 on the relative scale.  Although a dichotomous score is more 
appropriate for hypothesis #2, all other hypotheses are scored on the relative scale, which is the score 
that will receive more attention.  
All of the hypotheses were scored on the relative scale, with hypothesis #4b receiving a score of 6, 
the lowest of all the hypotheses.  The closest hypotheses to hypothesis #4b were both hypothesis #3 
and Multi-Stage7 (which applies hypothesis #4b as the first step before applying hypothesis #2), 
which scored 7.  However, a facet of hypothesis #4b removes its opportunity to be considered the 
most accurate hypothesis.  Similar to hypothesis #1, hypothesis #4b appears to expect all provincial 
governments to react in one particular way, except for Ontario and Québec.  Hypothesis #4b predicts 
that all other provincial governments will react in a neutral manner.  This prediction allows this 
hypothesis to score well on a relative scale, as with eight of the predictions being neutral, the 
hypothesis only requires a small number actually react that way in order to have a very low score.  
After correctly predicting Alberta and Ontario’s reactions, this hypothesis only required a correct 
prediction for three more provinces. This allowed it to be wrong in five different instances, yet still 
receive a higher score than other hypotheses that predicted an equal amount of correct reactions.  
Thus, the scoring system benefits hypothesis #4b but does not make this hypothesis a very accurate 
predictor of governmental behaviour.  
This leaves Multi-Stage7 and hypothesis #3 as the most accurate predictors of provincial reactions.  
However, the first component of Multi-Stage7 is hypothesis #4b, which, as listed above is not a very 
good predictor of governmental behaviour because of its near blanket prediction of neutral reactions, 
which allows it to take advantage of the scoring system.  Including hypothesis #2 in the process raises 
the validity of Multi-Stage7’s score slightly, but Multi-Stage7’s use of hypothesis #4b in the initial 
stage of the process, and its relative scale scoring advantage of predicting almost all of the provinces 
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to react neutrally, removes the hypothesis from consideration for the most accurate predictor of 
provincial reactions.  This leaves hypothesis #3, based on ideology and correctly predicting five 
provincial reactions, as the most accurate predictor of provincial reactions based on its low relative 
scale score of 7.  
Upon concluding the analysis of each hypothesis, it is clear that hypothesis #2 and hypothesis #3 
are the most accurate predictors of governmental behaviour.  Although limited by its design, 
hypothesis #2 appears to be the most accurate predictor on the dichotomous scale.  The dichotomous 
scale scoring system demonstrated that hypothesis #2 predicted the most correct reactions of the 
original four hypotheses.  Due to its inability to be scored on the relative scale, because of the 
required folding of the dependant variable, hypothesis #2 was combined with other hypotheses in 
order to test whether or not such combinations could potentially increase predictive capability.  
Analysis has determined that in the case of using the relative scale, the multi-stage hypotheses had a 
wide variety of scores, with those testing the second hypothesis first averaging a better score than 
when applied second.  In addition, when using the dichotomous scale, it was clear that the second 
hypothesis outperformed hypotheses focused on ideology and public opinion in terms of both correct 
predictions and score.  Therefore, in regards to the dichotomous scale, it is clear that a government’s 
current legislative position appears to be the most accurate predictor of how a government will react 
or decide on important policy decisions.  
Although hypothesis #3 was outperformed by hypothesis #2 on the dichotomous scale and in terms 
of overall correct predictions, hypothesis #3 received the lowest score on the relative scale among 
those accepted.  Analysis of the scorecard demonstrates that hypothesis #3 performed better than all 
of the original and multi-stage hypotheses in terms of overall score, and did so by a large margin in 
some instances.  Hypothesis #3 correctly predicted the reactions of five provincial governments, but 
almost as important, only had two completely wrong predictions.  The hypothesis predicted that both 
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British Columbia and Québec would welcome the decision due to their ideological predisposition 
towards increasing the private sector role in health care, however, both of these provincial 
governments reacted negatively to the decision.  Therefore, it is clear that in terms of the relative 




After testing the predictions made in each of the hypotheses against the actual reactions of the 
provincial governments, two hypotheses could be considered the most important predictor of a 
government’s reaction to the Chaoulli decision, a government’s law and ideology.  The score each 
hypotheses received, as presented in the scorecard in the previous chapter, demonstrates that, 
although other variables played a role in how provincial governments reacted to the decision, a 
government’s law was clearly the most accurate predictor of governmental behaviour in terms of 
making the most correct predictions and scoring the lowest on the dichotomous scale, while a 
government’s ideology was the lowest scoring variable on the relative scale.     
The study’s main goal has been to investigate why provincial governments reacted to the Chaoulli
decision as they did.  In order to make this determination, four hypotheses were developed, based on 
the current literature, and some of these were combined to create multi-stage hypotheses with the goal 
of increasing the hypotheses’ predictive capacity.  These hypotheses were then tested against the 
actual reactions provided by each provincial government in response to the Court’s verdict.
Most of the hypotheses received better than average scores when graded on both the dichotomous 
and relative scales.  Generally, provincial governments were not happy with the Court ruling on 
provincial law. Although some governments welcomed the decision, in general, provincial 
governments remained wary of the Court’s involvement in matters falling in provincial jurisdiction. 
Each provincial government’s response generally fell in line with their laws on private insurance and
the degree to which the striking down of provincial bans on private insurance would directly affect 
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their own system of regulation.  Some provincial governments chose to welcome the decision even 
though it contravened their current legislative position; but the reverse was also true, as some 
provinces reacted negatively to the decision, although it did not go against a law in place in the 
province.  A government’s ideological predisposition may have persuaded Alberta to react positively 
or Ontario to react negatively, but did not persuade other provinces, notably Québec and British 
Columbia, to react in a particular way.  Finally, some provincial governments reacted in line with 
public opinion within the province, while others did not.  In almost every case, provincial government 
reactions could often be linked to a set of predictions made by one of the hypotheses, with exceptions 
in every case.    
The general implications of the study can be drawn from the scorecard presented in the previous 
chapter.  The most important factor determining governmental behaviour appears to be either a 
government’s current law or ideology.  Both of these variables produced the best score on one of the 
two scales, but a government’s law also made the most correct predictions.  The performance of the 
second hypothesis demonstrates that a government’s current law is usually a strong indicator of how a 
government will behave.  The suggestion that there should be a change to a law, especially when 
driven by a court, would be generally received with antagonism. However, there are situations in 
which a government may welcome such change, either because a government may have inherited a 
policy that for ideological reasons it wants to change, or because the change may be popular with the 
public.  Although these other variables did not produce as many correct predictions as a government’s 
current law when tested against each government’s reaction, it is clear from the scores displayed in 
the scorecard that one or more of the governments will be influenced by one of the variables before 
they make policy decisions.  Nevertheless, governments generally prefer to make changes to their 
laws on their own terms, and thus, as demonstrated through the testing of each hypothesis, one of the 
most accurate methods to predict a government’s behaviour is a government’s current law.
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Although a government’s ideology did not lead to as many correct predictions of provincial 
reactions as a government’s law, hypothesis #3 scored the lowest on the relative scale, thus making it 
one of the most accurate predictors of provincial reactions to the decision.  The results from the 
scorecard demonstrate that governments often consider their ideological preferences when making 
policy decisions. An example of ideology acting as the driving force behind a government’s 
behaviour is revealed through the government of Alberta’s reaction to the Chaoulli decision.  The 
Alberta government has a history of calls for expanding the role of the private sector in health care, 
and the government acted in a manner consistent with their ideology, even though doing so 
contravened its laws.  Furthermore, although the Alberta government has been one of the foremost 
opponents of judicial activism, speaking out several times on the issue during the same-sex marriage 
debates, the government’s ideology has drove it to embrace the Court handing down a decision that 
many onlookers would consider an “activist” approach.   
Political calculation was the third explanatory variable tested in the study and did not perform as 
well as a government’s current law or ideology.  Aside from hypothesis #4b and the previously stated 
problems with accepting the results of this hypothesis, political calculation consistently produced 
more incorrect than correct predictions and scored higher than the average score on both scales.  This 
does not mean that political calculation did not play a role in provincial reactions to the decision, but 
rather that political calculation was not an accurate predictor of provincial reactions to the Chaoulli
decision.
Although the study has general implications for understanding government behaviour, the research 
performed also points to specific implications regarding health care policy.  One of the implications 
for health care is that provincial governments are open to Supreme Court decisions in the area of 
health care, while more reluctant to accept decisions in other areas falling under the purview of 
provincial legislatures.  It was originally expected that all provincial governments would react 
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negatively to the Court intervening in an area of provincial jurisdiction.  This was expected due to the 
provinces’ struggles for increased autonomy since the early days of Confederation, as well as their 
natural distrust for an institution that is appointed solely by the federal government.  However, 
although the governments of BC, Ontario, and Saskatchewan all acted as interveners in the case, not a 
single provincial government has challenged the legitimacy of the Court’s decision.  Conversely, 
provincial governments have made challenges to the legitimacy of Court decisions in other areas of 
provincial jurisdiction.
Provincial governments have not been reluctant to challenge the Supreme Court when it hands 
down verdicts in areas of provincial jurisdiction.  Two examples of provincial governments making 
these challenges occurred when the government of Alberta spoke out against the Court’s ruling in 
favour of same-sex marriage, and when the government of Québec reacted negatively to the Court
striking down Québec’s prohibition of the use of English on signs.  These challenges to the Supreme 
Court demonstrate that provincial governments are willing to challenge decisions in areas falling 
under their purview, thus leading to the conclusion that, in the area of health care, provincial 
governments have come to accept the Supreme Court’s decisions as acceptable.
Another implication derived from the study is that if provincial governments were to make the 
decision to increase the role of the private sector in health care, political leaders would not base it on 
ideological predisposition to greater private sector involvement alone.  It was originally expected that 
governments with an ideological predisposition towards increasing private sector involvement in 
health care would welcome the decision, and use the judicial affirmation to fulfill their goal of 
increasing the role of the private sector. However, political calculation proved a strong factor driving 
political behaviour to the point that governments viewing the decision as having a negative impact on 
voters did not openly welcome the decision as expected.  It appears that regardless of how strongly a 
government feels toward increasing the role of the private sector in health care, their political 
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calculation will be the determining factor, thus requiring strong public opinion in favour of such a 
change before opening the door to further private involvement.
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British Columbia Vancouver Province
Vancouver Sun
Manitoba Winnipeg Free Press
Newfoundland and Labrador The Telegram
New Brunswick New Brunswick Telegraph Journal
Times and Transcript
Nova Scotia The Chronicle Herald
Ontario The Toronto Star




                                                




Private Clinics by Province
Alberta
Clinic Name Clinic Name
Coronation Day Surgery Centre Groot Dermasurgery Clinic
The Morgentaler Clinic Plastic and Cosmetic Laser Surgical Centre 
Inc. 
David B. Climhenga Professional 
Corporation
Alberta Eye Institute Inc.
Gimbel Eye Centre Holy Cross Surgical Centre
Royce L.C. Johnson Professional 
Corporation
E. Wayne Tunis Professional Corporation
Walter Dorovolsky Professional 
Corporation
Terence K. Vankka Professional 
Corporation
Darrell Andrew Paul Gotaas Professional 
Corporation
Kensington Clinic
Randall W. Kreutz Professional 
Corporation
Douglas J. Vincelli Professional 
Corporation
Saranjeev S. Lalh Professional Corporation Donald I. Wakeham Professional 
Corporation
Kevin E. Lung Professional Corporation Marlborough Surgi-Centre
E. Christopher Robinson Professional 
Corporation
Royal View Surgi-Centre
Thomas R. Stevenson Professional 
Corporation
The Anaesthesia Centre for Dentistry
Rocky Mountain Surgery Centre Mitchell Eye Centre





Clinic Name Clinic Name
South Fraser Surgical Centre Inc. Victoria Surgery
New Westminster Surgical Centre Dr. Gerry Zimmerman Inc.
Valley Surgery Centre Delbrook Surgical Centre
McCallum Surgical Centre False Creek Surgical Centre
Seafield Surgical Centre Ambulatory Surgical Centre
Dr. Raymon Kahwaji Okanagan Health Surgical Centre
South Island Surgical Centre Kamloops Surgical Centre
Broadmead Surgical Centre Prince George Surgical Centre
Cambie Surgery Centre Comox Valley Surgical Associates
Québec
Clinic Name Clinic Name
IRM Québec Medica
Medisys Health Group Radiologie Laennec
Ville Marie Medical and Women’s Health 
Centre
Reso-Concorde/Reso-Carrefour
Ville Marie PET/CT Centre Westmount Square Medical Imaging
Centre d’Imagerie Medicale ResoScan IRM St. Joseph MRI
Centre de Radiologie West Island Leger et Associes Radiologists




Questionnaires Provided to Provincial Governments
ALBERTA
 Do you think the decision will have any immediate and/or direct implications to the 
manner in which your province delivers health care?  Do you feel that it is 
likely/possible that your province would face a similar legal challenge?
 Is the Alberta government considering removing its own ban on third party insurance 
voluntarily rather than waiting for a legal challenge to the ban?
BRITISH COLUMBIA/MANITBOA/NEWFOUNDLAND AND 
LABRADOR/NEW BRUNSWICK/NOVA SCOTIA/ONTARIO/PEI
 Do you think the decision will have any immediate and/or direct implications to the 
manner in which your province delivers health care?  Do you feel that it is 
likely/possible that your province would face a similar legal challenge?
 Has your province made any changes, or are you contemplating making any changes, 
to buttress against the possibility of having a similar challenge occur in your 
province?
 Do you think the Supreme Court overstepped its boundaries in striking down a law 
approved by a provincial legislature?
 Do you believe that a parallel system can alleviate problems in the public system, 
such as wait times, as suggested by the Supreme Court Justices, or do you feel that 
the introduction of such a system will lead to further problems in the public system?
SASKATCHEWAN
 Do you think the decision will have any immediate and/or direct implications to the 
manner in which your province delivers health care?  Do you feel that it is 
likely/possible that your province would face a similar legal challenge?
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 Has your province made any changes, or are you contemplating making any changes, 
to buttress against the possibility of having a similar challenge occur in your 
province?
 Do you think the Supreme Court overstepped its boundaries in striking down a law 
approved by a provincial legislature?
 Although there is no prohibition on private insurance for insured services, 
Saskatchewan intervened on behalf of Québec in the Chaoulli decision.  What was the 
motivation for this decision
